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Abstract 
This paper represents the results of a small-scale qualitative study, exploring 
public perceptions of the redistributive effects of taxation and public spending 
in the UK. Redistribution is not at the top of people’s minds when they consider 
these issues and it is a complex subject on which they have thought little. People 
appear to apply separate principles of ‘fairness’ and ‘mutuality’ to the structures 
of taxation and public spending. Fairness in taxation may involve more 
progressivity than the current system, and those with low incomes may need 
more help. The support this implies for the redistributive impact of government 
does not appear to be primarily motivated by concerns about making incomes 
more equal, but rather the outcome of belief in a system in which everyone can 
get help when they need it, and everyone contributes according to their means. 
 
JEL number:I38 
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A Summary and conclusions 
A1 The study 
This paper is based on the findings of a small-scale qualitative research project 
originally intended to provide input into the design and development of a 
projected British Social Attitudes Survey module, covering public perceptions 
and values in relation to redistribution within the tax system. The work was 
commissioned jointly by the National Centre for Social Research (NCSR) and 
the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE), with ESRC funding.   
 
41 people were involved in six small group discussion sessions held in three 
areas of Britain in April of 2003. The sample was selected by quota methods, 
taking into account household income and political leanings as well as lifestage 
and gender. The study was designed and carried out by Alan Hedges, an 
independent social researcher.   
 
This was purely an exploratory project, and the sample was limited in size – and 
also in the field time available to unpack a complex and ramified set of topics. 
The findings should be regarded throughout as grounded hypotheses rather than 
proven facts, and some of the issues could usefully be further explored.   
 
A set of stimulus materials was developed to provide relevant information for 
participants as the discussion progressed.  (See B) 
 
A2 Summary of main findings 
1 The context for considering redistribution 
The public generally has limited knowledge and understanding of the complex 
system by which tax is collected and spent. This is normally seen as a difficult 
issue, and of limited interest. People are often concerned with the impact of 
taxation on their personal finances, and with the quality of the services and 
other benefits it provides, but they are not normally much interested in the 
mechanics of the process, or in the intricate balances within the system. 
Knowledge is typically incomplete and fragmented, and misconceptions are 
sometimes apparent. In many ways the public perspective tends to be bottom-up 
disaggregated and concrete, rather than top-down, unified and abstract. People 
have a rough-and-ready (but still usually fragmented and incomplete) 
knowledge of the way the system impacts on them as individuals, but only a 
limited understanding of the system as an overall entity.  (C2.2) 
 
There seems a widespread perception that British taxes are high and rising, 
although many participants had little idea how much they actually pay 
themselves. At the same time there is an even stronger perception that the 
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services and benefits provided are often unsatisfactory, and have been cut back 
in many ways. Participants often feel that the situation continues to deteriorate, 
leading to an image of worsening value. There is a sense of paying “more for 
less” as time goes on. Few people think they see signs that the corner has been 
turned, in spite of recent increases in government spending.  (C2.3) 
 
Taxation is not only a complex, but also a somewhat painful subject, because it 
involves ‘your’ money being taken away from you. Even those who thoroughly 
endorse the principle (and even the level) of taxation often find the actual 
practice of having to pay unpleasant. Discussion of taxation and public spending 
(or indeed anything to do with money) tends to have a strong emotional as well 
as a rational component.  (C1.1, C2.2) 
 
Many participants felt that what they get back from the state isn’t commensurate 
with what they pay out. This is inevitably only an impression, not the outcome 
of an actuarial calculation on their part – members of the public can only guess 
how much they pay in tax, and they typically have little or no idea about the 
cash value of the services they receive, particularly where these are benefits in 
kind. Some were quite surprised to see estimates of the cash value of services 
drawn by different income groups (see D14). People tend to think of services 
like health and education as just ‘free’, and usually have little notion what these 
might be worth to them. This aggravates their sense of poor value, which 
primarily arises from discontent with aspects of the service provided (as does 
the prevalent assumption of waste and inefficiency).  (C2.2, C2.3) 
 
However, my impression is that the current mood is more concerned with 
getting the services fixed than with reducing taxation. That’s certainly not to say 
that people don’t care about the level of tax, but that they would feel more 
content with it if they felt they were getting the kind of service they really want 
and need.  Some say they would be willing to pay more if this would really get 
them good service, and not be wasted.  (C2.3) 
 
Dissatisfaction about the above matters is often near the front of people’s minds, 
and tends to dominate their perceptions in this connection. When they do think 
about taxes and spending this is what usually grabs their attention – issues like 
redistribution tend to get drowned out by complaints about services, taxes and 
the value these represent.  (C2.1) 
 
People are aware that there are many different types of tax, but they often find it 
difficult to call more than a few examples to mind at one time. One of the key 
differences is between income-based and spending-based taxes. Participants 
were generally aware that these exist, but often hadn’t thought through the full 
implications. This is important for redistribution, since income taxes are 
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generally redistributive and spending taxes are not. This is again not something 
many people seem to have thought much about.  (C2.2, C3) 
 
Similarly people are broadly aware of many of the ways in which taxes are 
spent, but again they don’t usually carry a clear mental picture of all the 
categories (much less the amounts spent on each). One of the most important 
distinctions is between benefits in cash and benefits in kind, but again this had 
not often been thought through prior to the discussions. Benefits in cash have a 
more-or-less known value (even if people often don’t have the precise amounts 
in their minds), but participants typically had little notion of either the cost or 
the value of benefits in kind – and often haven’t even thought to wonder about 
it. They certainly don’t have anything approaching a synoptic figure in their 
heads that says ‘this is the amount I get back from the state in return for paying 
my taxes’. The various services tend to live in different parts of people’s minds, 
so there is little impetus to aggregate them mentally. Thus there is no vivid 
sense of a quantum of benefit to offset the more sharply visualised quantum of 
pain that paying taxes causes.  (C1.1, C2.2, D14) 
 
On the other hand much of the controversy about public spending relates to cash 
benefits. People are often centrally preoccupied with the quality of education 
and (particularly) health services, but there rarely seems to be much argument 
about these being universally available – except in isolated situations like 
‘health tourism’.  With Social Security by contrast there is often lively debate 
(and sometimes strong feelings) about who should get what.  (C1.1, C2.2) 
 
In spite of criticisms of services there seems to be general support for the 
principle of the welfare state as something which supports people when they 
need help, and which spreads the cost of doing so proportionately to their ability 
to pay. Some people have misgivings of one sort or another about its detailed 
implementation, but I did not hear arguments in favour of abandoning it. Many 
participants felt they would have been worse off if the welfare state had not 
existed, in spite of their criticisms about its shortcomings. Private sector 
provision is beginning to look expensive and unreliable in various respects. 
However, many have little idea about the cost of private healthcare and 
education – and even if they do they have no real basis for comparing these with 
the (largely unknown) costs of state provision.  (C2.4) 
 
There were large differences of opinion about whether people should be allowed 
to opt out of paying for services like health and education if they make private 
provision, but the balance of feeling seemed opposed to this. However, not 
everyone has thought through the full implications of allowing or not allowing 
opt-outs.  (C2.6) 
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Means testing of benefits and services tends to be redistributive, but attitudes to 
it vary a lot – not only between individuals, but between types of benefit. 
Benefits in kind like health and education are not generally seen to be means 
tested, and people were not arguing that this should change. However, opinions 
were more divided about cash benefits. The mood tended to be opposed to 
means testing pensions, although some would like to see child benefit means 
tested. Means testing as a concept seems widely unpopular – not only because 
it’s seen to be expensive to operate, stigmatising and damaging to take-up, but 
also because it is thought to draw unfair and arbitrary lines between people 
whose needs seem similar. Moreover many feel that there is an inalienable right 
to (for example) pensions simply because people have “paid in” for them. 
 (C2.5) 
 
Participants did not perceive different kinds of service and benefit in the same 
way. Pensions are seen very differently from other cash benefits, the criteria 
applied to education are very different from those applied to child benefit, etc. 
People would apply (for example) the idea of means testing very differently to 
each of these areas. (C2.5) 
 
2 Perceptions of redistribution 
Redistribution is a complex phenomenon. There are basically two types: 
? Temporal redistribution, in which an individual may be a net contributor 
at some points in time and a net beneficiary at others, as their needs and 
means fluctuate through their lives. 
? Interpersonal redistribution, in which resources tend to flow from people 
with larger means and smaller needs to people with larger needs and 
smaller means.  (D1) 
 
The study deliberately took an oblique approach to redistribution – rather than 
exploring the semantics of the term itself it seemed preferable to talk about 
taxation and public spending, and then nudge the conversation in the direction 
of the redistributive elements. At a later stage in the discussions stimulus 
materials were used to illustrate some of the outcomes of redistributive 
processes.  (D2, D14) 
  
The semantics of the term itself were not explored, but the impression is that 
most people would understand it more in the interpersonal than the temporal 
sense. Redistribution over time is an integral part of the basic welfare state deal, 
almost like an insurance contract – you pay in steadily when you can so that you 
can draw out when you need it. It is probably where some people systematically 
win or lose (usually because of differences in income levels) that the notion of 
redistribution starts to have much meaning.  (D1) 
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On the whole participants supported the idea of redistribution, albeit with some 
caveats and qualifications. Most found it easier to get their minds round the 
concept when they saw some concrete examples of the ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ for 
different income groups (although these needed careful explanation). These 
examples did not usually change people’s minds substantially about supporting 
redistribution. Some were a little stunned by the very large amounts of resource 
transferred between the highest and lowest income groups (particularly when 
they looked at lifetime outcomes). But in general these outcomes were largely 
accepted as fair.  (D3, D14) 
 
Some participants persisted in feeling that those in the highest quintile group for 
income could reasonably be expected to pay more, although such sentiments 
were sometimes diluted when participants saw the extent of resource transfers 
taking into account the value of services as well as the cost of taxation to 
produce a net win/lose figure. The impression is that the level of annual 
household income at which people might be expected to pay extra would 
probably be in the region of £100,000 or more, although this was not 
extensively probed.  (D14)  
 
Many participants were surprised to find that the lowest income group pays a 
higher proportion of its income in tax than the highest group, which struck them 
as unfair and wrong. This effect is due to the regressive impact of spending 
taxes, a factor which many hadn’t considered much before.  (C3) 
 
My impression is that for most participants the reasons for supporting an 
element of redistribution are not primarily rooted in egalitarian sentiments. The 
main drivers typically (and in varying proportions) seem to be: 
? A feeling that we have a collective duty to support those in need. 
? A belief that rainy days come unexpectedly, and that we all have an 
interest in ensuring that support is there if and when we need it. 
However, there was no time to explore these complex motivations thoroughly.
 (D3) 
 
Participants were shown a quadrant diagram listing combinations of flat-rate 
and income-based options for both taxes and benefits. Income-related payments 
plus flat-rate benefits seemed most popular – but some also want an income-
based element for some of the benefits. This choice seems fairly close to the 
current system.  (D10) 
 
People seem happier with the notion of redistribution if they picture it as a 
process whereby individuals pay into and draw out of a central pot – which is 
indeed the case. Some get less comfortable when they visualise it as one person 
(or group of people) making direct payments to another. This is not actually 
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what happens, but it is a way people sometimes look at it. The outcome is the 
same, but the implied narrative (and hence the emotional tonality) can be very 
different.  (D4) 
 
Two fundamental concepts which underlie many people’s attitudes to 
redistribution are ‘fairness’ and ‘mutuality’. The former word was used a lot, 
the latter is just a label I have applied to a loose but important bundle of ideas. 
People have simple common-sense notions of what is fair, and the report lists 
some of the ways in which the word was used. The problem is that simple and 
widely-endorsed ‘fairness’ criteria often conflict with each other. Therefore the 
decisive factor is often not just what the criteria are, but how they are balanced 
off against each other – but in the real world people do not often have occasion 
to think through this trade-off process very far.  (D5) 
 
The notion of ‘mutuality’ describes a basic set of common expectations which 
seem to relate to the way people perceive the welfare state. The important thing 
is not that everyone should pay or draw the same, but that there should be a 
mutual set of rights and obligations which ensure that individuals draw what 
they reasonably need to and contribute what they reasonably can. What people 
tend to talk about (and value) is evening out risk, supporting those most in need 
of help, and sharing the financial burden according to ability to pay. Since both 
means and needs clearly vary between individuals this is by nature a 
redistributive mechanism, but again the redistribution is almost more of a by-
product than an up-front objective. The main aim is simply to make sure that 
everyone gets access to good services and is reasonably free of worry and 
hardship.  (D5, C2.4) 
 
In this sense the welfare state looks a bit like a club. The problem some people 
raise is what happens to those who aren’t members of the club (like ‘asylum 
seekers’ and ‘health tourists’); or who are technically members but who haven’t 
bothered to pay their dues (by not working when they reasonably could, or by 
manipulating or defrauding the system in their own interests)? Some feel such 
people shouldn’t be entitled to the same benefits as those who have 
conscientiously done their bit. In their minds it is unfair to the conscientious to 
redistribute their resources to those who are not (as it were) members in good 
standing. Examples of this issue sometimes engender a lot of heat. But others 
take a more inclusive and Samaritan-like view, seeing mutual responsibilities as 
more a matter of common humanity than merely of membership and paying 
dues. In practice few would advocate leaving even the least ‘deserving’ cases 
without any support at all, but different people would draw the line in different 
places.  (D5, D6.1) 
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Mutuality nevertheless remains a good way of describing one of the main 
engines of support for redistribution. The argument is mainly about what 
constitutes a violation of mutuality, and what should happen when this occurs.  
 
There is a strong element of insurance in people’s perceptions of the welfare 
state. Life is uncertain, and loss of health or employment could be painful and 
destructive if there is no support when it happens. However the insurance model 
is limited – it fits aspects of health and unemployment well, but seems less 
applicable to education or even pensions – these are not ‘risk’ factors in the 
same way, but merely cyclic or periodic episodes of need and heavy 
expenditure.  (D11) 
 
The insurance model can also appear largely self-interested – you support others 
so they will support you when your time comes. But there also seem to be more 
altruistic elements in some people’s make-up – you support others because it is 
right to do so, and because you sympathise with their predicament. Some people 
also perceive societal or systemic benefits – living in a kindlier society, 
enjoying the economic and social fruits of a well-educated population, and so 
on. However these indirect benefits are perhaps less obvious and more complex 
to analyse than direct benefits to individuals.  (D3, D11) 
 
One factor which may threaten aspects of the redistributive consensus in future 
is the dwindling sense of continuity and the growing mood of uncertainty about 
the future of the system. Temporal redistribution depends intrinsically on 
continuity – your turn to draw may never come if the entitlements you have 
been providing for others no longer operate when your time comes to need 
them. This kind of continuity is no longer so readily taken for granted. (D12) 
 
People often seem more uncertain about redistribution between geographical 
areas than between income groups. Uncertainty is magnified when talking about 
people from outside the ‘welfare club’ area (basically Britain), as noted above. I 
saw little or no sign that the Devolved Administrations have so far changed 
English people’s perceptions of the club boundaries. This may or may not 
happen in future.  (D13) 
 
At the end of the groups participants were shown some CASE calculations of 
the lifetime impact of redistribution. This was a new thought to many, and had 
to be explained carefully. The figures projecting resource transfer over a whole 
lifetime tend to seem shockingly large to some, but in spite of this the pattern 
shown largely seemed to be accepted.  (D14)  
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A3 Some conclusions and implications 
The main conclusion is that redistribution is not currently a front-line issue for 
many members of the public. Knowledge and understanding of the tax and 
spending system is limited and fragmented, and other issues (notably service 
quality, and also the level of taxation) seem more gripping than the way 
liabilities and entitlements are distributed. Redistribution becomes a matter of 
direct public concern mainly in high-profile (and often contentious and strongly 
argued) cases of disputed entitlement – asylum seekers currently seem the most 
common reference here, but it is often applied generally to those who are not 
thought to have satisfied the principle of mutuality by contributing reasonably to 
the system. These factors don’t generally undermine the principle of 
redistribution, they only affect where you draw its borders.  
 
There appears to be widespread support in all the sectors studied for 
redistribution on something like the current model, and there is some feeling 
that those at the bottom of the income ladder need a bit more help, while those 
at the top might reasonably contribute a bit more than they do. This support 
does not usually seem to be primarily motivated by a direct desire to make 
incomes more equal – it seems to be the inevitable outcome of the widespread 
belief in a system in which everyone can get help when they need it, and 
everyone contributes according to their means. This seems more redistributive 
in effect than in intent.  
 
Redistribution is itself a complex subject, which few people have thought 
extensively about. Participants needed to be given some information 
(particularly about redistributive outcomes) in order to engage with it at more 
than a vague and generalised level. Key information can be absorbed, but it does 
need to be clearly presented and explained.  
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B Basis for this paper 
This paper is based on a small piece of qualitative research carried out for 
CASE and NCSR in summer 2003 and funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC). 
 
It was a very small-scale project – not intended as self-standing, but originally 
designed to provide material for developing a British Social Attitudes survey 
module. Nevertheless it yielded some rich insights and ideas, which are set out 
below.  
 
The study was entirely qualitative in approach, based on group discussion 
techniques, and designed to generate insight into the way people think, feel and 
behave. Qualitative research is concerned with understanding the way people 
operate, rather than measuring the frequency with which different attitudes or 
behaviours occur. It cannot provide statistical information – words like ‘most’ 
or ‘few’ or ‘widespread’ are sometimes used to suggest the general drift of 
opinion, but these are to be interpreted only as broad descriptive indicators. 
Even by qualitative standards this study is small in scale and the number of 
sampling points was limited. The findings should therefore be read as grounded 
hypotheses rather than established facts.   
 
The objective was to explore and map public understanding of and attitudes to 
the ways in which taxes and welfare spending in the UK have the effect of 
redistributing resources between different kinds of individual, groups, and 
stages of the life cycle in the British system of tax and spending. This is not 
easy – not only because redistributive mechanisms are complex, and not 
something which the public normally give much thought to, but also because 
public understanding of the workings of tax and spending is typically somewhat 
limited. 
 
Six group discussions were carried out in three regionally-spread English 
locations: Barnet (London suburb), Sheffield (Northern city) and Rugby 
(smaller Midland town).  48 people were recruited for the study, and 41 of these 
actually took part, an average of nearly seven people per group. The sample was 
selected by quota methods. Quotas were set to ensure a good mixture of 
participants in terms of household income and political leanings, age or life 
stage and gender. Details of methods and sample (including a sample profile) 
are in the full report (available from Jane Dickson at CASE, 
j.dickson@lse.ac.uk). 
 
The research was carried out by Alan Hedges, an independent qualitative 
researcher specialising in social and public sector studies.  
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There are two broad ways of approaching a complex topic like redistribution. 
You can work outward from the word itself, finding out what people understand 
by it, and what they think of it. Or you can come at it more obliquely, by 
exploring perceptions of the tax and spending system and working round to 
examine how people understand and feel about the redistributive elements of 
this. This study generally took the latter oblique approach. This was productive, 
because it avoids the risk of setting up particular expectations, and possibly 
getting trapped in a semantic box by focusing on words rather than ideas. 
However it would also have been good to have more time to unpack the term 
‘redistribution’ itself, but this was not practicable given the amount of ground to 
cover. 
 
Because public knowledge is limited various materials were prepared to 
stimulate discussion and help people to express their views and priorities. 
Copies of all these materials are in the full report, and some of the main items 
are reviewed in C3, D10 and D14. 
 
The study necessarily covered a wide range of subject-matter, and there was not 
enough time in a standard 1½ hour group to focus in detail on many interesting 
topics, which could have done with lengthier unpacking than was possible in the 
time available. 
 
Moreover opinion often evolved during discussion as participants talked 
through the issues and took in information. Few people had extensive ready-
made understanding of many of the matters under discussion, and attitudes often 
evolved during the conversation.   
 
Verbatim quotations are sometimes used to illustrate the way people think and 
talk. Each quote is preceded by ‘M’ or ‘F’, showing whether the participant is 
male or female. ‘I’ denotes remarks from the interviewer. Quotes are followed 
by a label showing the main characteristics of the session it came from: 
Area ‘Bar’ = Barnet, ‘Shef’ = Sheffield, ‘Rug’ = Rugby  
Income group  Among pensioners (Sheffield) ‘Higher’ = £10,000 or more, ‘Lower’ 
= below £10,000 
Among non-pensioner groups (Barnet, Rugby) ‘High’ = £26,000 or 
more, ‘Low’ = below £26,000 
Type  ‘Left’ = politically left-leaning, ‘Right’ = right-leaning 
‘Mixed’ = mixed or no political affiliation 
‘Pen’ = pensioner (mixed affiliations) 
 
The income groups are all based on gross household incomes. In practice all the 
higher pensioner incomes were in the range £10,000-£25999. 
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C Background and context 
This chapter sets out some perceptions of the tax and spending system as 
context for subsequent discussion of redistribution. 
 
C1 Understanding of tax and spending system 
C1.1 Fragmented awareness and understanding 
Most people’s understanding of the system by which the state raises and spends 
money is severely limited. Some have more expertise (and more interest) than 
others, but few in these sessions had more than a fragmentary picture of what 
happens. 
 
This is mainly because it is an extremely ramified and complex system. There 
are lots of different taxes, and many different types of expenditure. Even the 
bones of what happens are difficult to get the mind round, but at the level of 
detail each of these financial sources and destinations involves an extremely 
intricate machinery of practice and regulation. Much of this is literally 
unknown, but even where the elements are at least vaguely familiar it is difficult 
for most people to juggle more than two or three aspects in their minds.  
 
F: ”I don’t think people are given enough information, and it’s not put simply 
enough for people to understand it” (Shef higher pen) 
 
It also tends to seem a fairly arid and remote topic, not one which most people 
would want to spend a lot of time thinking and talking about in a general sort of 
way. They are sometimes interested in certain aspects of the inputs and outputs 
– like the amount of tax they pay, whether it seems fairly levied, the services 
provided, whether money seems to be spent efficiently and on the right things, 
and so on. Issues like these sometimes arouse strong feelings, but few people 
normally spend time contemplating the machinery itself, or the way it operates, 
or the way different parts of the system balance out.  
 
F: “It’s things you don’t normally think about, isn’t it really?” (Bar high 
right) 
 
People usually have a rough-and-ready working knowledge of the system. They 
know at least roughly how the thing works overall: 
? Government, councils and other authorities collect money by various 
means 
? They then spend this on a whole range of services. 
But members of the public don’t usually seem to have thought this through very 
far, and their picture of both the tax and the spending side of the equation 
typically seems incomplete, patchy and hazy – and sometimes inaccurate. 
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Knowledge of different types of tax: Many of the types of tax are at least 
vaguely known, but if you ask people to list the ways by which the state raises 
money they will typically think quickly of two or three types, after which they 
tend to dry up fairly quickly. Other kinds of tax often bubble up to the surface of 
the mind sooner or later during discussion, but few people have a ready-made 
synoptic grip on all the different ways in which revenue gets raised, which they 
can call on in thinking about the way the system works. Even the information 
they already have in their heads often has to be put together painstakingly 
before it is ready for use. Sometimes misconceptions are apparent. 
 
F: “I know they make an awful lot in tax on cigarettes” 
F: “And petrol” 
I: “So you pay tax on cigarettes, what else do you pay tax on? How do you 
pay taxes?” 
F: “Petrol” 
F: “I think there’s tax on beer too. All the basic things that the commoners 
like” 
F: “On VAT” 
M: “It’s everything, food” 
I: “How else do you pay money to the state and to the councils?” 
F: “The council tax, poll tax, so it’s on the water rates and all that sort of 
thing, a kind of tax but it’s a service” 
M: “It’s PAYE innit?” 
M: “Your tax on your earnings obviously goes to there, your national 
insurance” (Rug low mixed) 
 
The different types of tax do not necessarily even live in the same mental 
pigeonholes. People’s experience of the system is disaggregated. They pay 
different types of tax to different people at different times and in different ways, 
and for most of the time in ordinary life there is no particular incentive to put all 
this together into one integrated global picture of taxation.  
 
Awareness of tax amounts paid: Participants typically seemed unaware of 
what they themselves actually pay in tax. Even if they wanted to work out the 
total amount of tax they pay it would be very laborious at best, because of the 
large number of different amounts paid through different channels at different 
times. It would hardly be feasible to tot up all the thousands of bits they pay.  
 
In practice it would in any case be impossible for an individual to work out their 
total tax bill, because some of their taxes are more or less invisible. Spending 
taxes like excise duty or VAT are often not identified separately on purchases, 
so people have little idea of what they have actually paid. Income tax, NI and 
council tax are at least in principle knowable, since people are told what they 
have to pay and/or what they have paid – but few people integrate these 
payments in their minds, and often they don’t even remember how much they 
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have recently paid under any one of these headings. They get statements, but 
these don’t often become organised knowledge in their minds 
 
This tends to apply even where they seem visibly aggrieved about their 
perceptions of the level of taxation. Thus people often feel they pay too much 
tax without having a clear idea how much they do actually pay.  
 
Not only did participants typically seem unclear about how much tax they pay 
personally, most seem unsure about how much tax the state raises in total, or 
how this breaks down by type of tax (either in absolute or percentage terms).  
 
Awareness of what tax is spent on: This vagueness also extends to the 
spending side. Most people can quickly mention a few of the things public 
money gets spent on, and when they are shown an actual list it contains few 
surprises1. People generally know that money is spent on education, health, law 
and order, bin collection, social security and so on – but again they can’t always 
call more than a few of these to mind at any one time.  
 
Typically participants had little idea what the total annual spend is, or how this 
breaks down between different types of expenditure.  
 
It became clear that few participants had even tried to work out what they get 
back from the state in benefits of one kind or another, and that most would not 
know how to attach value to benefits in kind – even if they thought of doing 
this, which seems unlikely (see C2.1 and C2.2).  
 
Among the materials shown to participants to stimulate reflection and 
discussion was a list of the main heads of government expenditure (see sheet F). 
This was not something most could begin to construct for themselves. Many 
people could not even call all these categories to mind – they generally stuck 
after naming two or three of them. Certainly the amounts would rarely be 
known. 
 
                                           
1   When I showed a list of heads of expenditure there were a few items people hadn’t 
thought of at all – like debt interest, for example, which is not widely known or 
understood.  
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F    Where did the money go to?
£22 billion6 % went on debt interest
£82 billion21% went on other things
£5 billion1% went on overseas aid
£15 billion4% went on transport and housing
£23 billion6% went on law and order
£24 billion6% went on defence
£112 billion 
£64 billion
15 billion
£33 billion
29% went on social security:
Pensioners
Children
Working age
£51 billion13% went on education
£58 billion 15% went on health
2001-2002  
 
Some commented that these figures might show what is spent, but they don’t 
tell you how productively it’s spent – or what the services are actually “worth”. 
Given widespread perceptions of “waste” and inefficiency (see C2.3) these are 
often not seen as the same things at all. 
 
M: “One of the issues here was about how efficiently they spend, so the 
administration of these are actually in those figures – you can’t see how 
much is going to administer it and how much is actually coming to the 
people” (Bar high right) 
 
C1.2 Terminology of tax and spending 
Even the names of the various taxes and benefits are sometimes hazy – many 
find it hard to remember the term ‘Council tax’, for example, and the term ‘Poll 
tax’ is still frequently heard. This is not helpful when it comes to understanding 
how things work – some do not seem to have a clear grasp, for example, of the 
differences in the basis on which local taxes have been collected over the last 
few decades (rates, community charge and council tax), although they 
sometimes have views about the principles that underlie them (like property 
value and capitation). 
 
Things that have ‘tax’ in their title (most obviously income tax) seem to come 
more quickly to mind when talking of taxes than things with other names. 
Duties are often referred to as ‘taxes’ (for example it’s ‘car tax’ not ‘vehicle 
excise duty’ to most people). Conversely most think of ‘VAT’ rather than 
‘Value Added Tax’, so that is sometimes more slowly remembered in the 
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context of talking about taxes – although it is clearly seen as a kind of tax once 
mentioned.  
 
National Insurance also generally seems recognised as a tax once mentioned, 
but it often tends to surface more slowly in discussion of taxation. 
 
C2 Perceptions of tax and spending 
C2.1 Attitudes to tax and spending 
People are often ambivalent about the system by which the government raises 
and spends money. As we have seen there is a good deal of uncertainty about 
just how the system works in detail. Participants also often had conflicting (and 
often unreconciled) principles, aspirations and needs in their minds.  
 
Tax and spending is not a subject most people usually seem to invest a great 
deal of thought in. It seems a complicated and unrewarding topic, and some of 
its associations are painful rather than pleasurable, particularly on the tax side. 
Particular issues may arise from time to time which provoke discussion and may 
even arouse strong feelings (like the state of the NHS, or the recent rise in 
council tax), but in the main it is something that whirs away in the background 
without attracting much active notice.  
 
The extraction of tax tends to have uncomfortable or even painful associations. 
Few people actually like paying tax, even those who are quite content in 
principle with what they have to pay. Some of your money just disappears from 
your control and use, and that isn’t a pleasant thought.   
 
M: “We’ve all said we think the principle of paying tax is all right, but I think 
most people if they could avoid paying some tax by – if you said, like, 
‘You’ve got to have one of your windows bricked up’, or whatever, ‘cos 
they used to have the window tax, then quite a lot of people would do that. 
Or you’d get an accountant, or whatever you do” (Bar high right) 
 
When that money is spent on services it ought to provide a balancing element of 
pleasure to offset the pain, but that doesn’t usually seem to be the case. Service 
provision is often hedged about by dissatisfactions (see C2.3). Moreover people 
aren’t usually clear about the linkages between what they spend and what they 
get, and don’t tend to attach cash values to the services received (see C2.2). So 
there tends to be a rather lop-sided view of the balance between getting and 
spending.  
 
Responses to taxation have powerful emotional as well as rational roots. 
 
M: “I think people have an emotional response to money in general. It’s not 
always logical, the way people spend money. And people always have an 
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emotional response to how money is spent – and how money is diverted” 
(Bar high right) 
 
There is a common perception that we are an overtaxed nation, although this 
perception is not usually based on a clear understanding of what we actually 
pay, or how this compares with other countries, or how it has changed over 
time. 
F: “I think we pay too much tax anyway at the moment. I’ve been quite 
crippled with everything that’s recently happened, like the council tax and 
everything, and petrol” (Bar high right) 
 
I: “Do you think you know what money is taken from you and what it’s spent 
on?” 
M: “Too much” 
M: “Yeah, I’ll go along with that” 
F: “Yeah, we’re too highly taxed in this country” 
I: “Do you think in this country people pay more taxes than you would, say 
in France?” 
All:“Yes” 
F: “Or even America” 
F: “I don’t know whether we’re higher taxed – are we higher taxed?” 
F: “We’re probably taxed in different ways” 
F: “Do they not pay more income tax in Europe? And then everything else is 
a bonus” 
F: “Don’t they have to pay for their own medical care?” (Rug low left) 
 
Taxes are also widely thought to be rising. 
 
The upshot is that participants were often wary and defensive in talking about 
taxation. 
 
M: “They like to get money off you, don’t they, the state?” (Rug low left) 
 
There were some clues that participants would often feel better about paying 
taxes if they felt they knew what was happening to their money, and that a 
proper account of the expenditure was given. 
 
F: “If we knew where the money was going – I can’t be bothered with people 
who say, ‘I don’t want my tax to go up’ – then don’t expect to be part of a 
system, don’t expect National Health, don’t expect your bins, don’t expect 
libraries, don’t expect anything if you don’t wanna pay tax” (Bar high left) 
 
M: “It would help if it started with accountability – there isn’t clear 
accountability to the general public – all we get is a chance every three or 
four years to vote a new government in, and they’re stuck for another four 
years” 
F: “And they all do as bad” 
F: “Criticise the previous one and then do what they said they wouldn’t do” 
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M: “Accountability – crystal-clear accountability. All these areas to the lay 
person are such grey areas. It’d be interesting to have independent 
consultants, third parties, that would really make these people and 
services accountable. Then you could get rid of the wastage and put the 
money back in where it’s needed” (Bar high left) 
 
F: “I don’t think we’re told the truth in many respects, I don’t think we’re 
told as much as we’d like to know, how money is truly spent” 
M: “Yeah, well the government and anything is run on a need-to-know – and 
we don’t need to know!” 
F: “I think it’s getting worse as time goes on, I mean they pretend they’re 
telling us a lot, but really I don’t think they do – they’re very secretive” 
(Shef lower pen) 
 
C2.2 Not a single homogeneous system 
The tax and spending system is not usually thought of as a single homogeneous 
entity. The logic, criteria and dynamics vary in some ways from sector to sector.  
 
If we take a bird’s-eye view of the system we can treat all forms of taxation as 
equivalent – all revenue-raising devices, differing only in the way they operate. 
In the same sense we can treat all forms of expenditure as equivalent. The 
global notion of ‘redistribution’ depends on this – we lump in different kinds of 
tax and different kinds of benefit, chucking health, education, pensions, other 
social security, policing, transport etc into one pot, on the assumption that they 
can all be treated as equivalent.  
 
This is a perfectly valid (indeed useful) perspective – but it is a high-level 
abstraction, and we shouldn’t assume that this is the way people normally look 
at things. Sometimes they have to make some effort to put together things which 
they normally think of as quite different.  
 
People’s perceptions of the tax and spending system tend to be specific, 
concrete and low-level, rather than generalised, abstract and high-level. The 
kind of synoptic bird’s-eye view of the whole system which comes naturally to 
policy analysts and researchers is something members of the public often have 
to make an awkward adjustment to. In the context of the present study this 
adjustment was an important part of the process of deliberation, and to some 
extent needs to be fuelled by information (see C3, D14).  
 
Different types of tax: As noted above, people are broadly aware there is a 
range of different types of tax, but most haven’t thought deeply about the 
implications of these. 
 
One of the most important distinctions from the point of view of redistribution 
is the difference between income-related taxes and spending-based taxes. This is 
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something most people are vaguely familiar with. They know that income tax is 
progressive (although very few use that word), that the more you earn the more 
you pay. They also know that taxes like VAT, petrol tax and so on are not 
income-related, and that everyone who buys items that bear these taxes pays the 
same. 
 
However not many people seem to have thought through the implications of this 
to the point of working out that spending taxes bear relatively more heavily than 
income taxes on low-income households. This was apparent from reactions to 
some of the stimulus materials, where people were quite surprised to see that 
those in the quintile group with the lowest household income pay a slightly 
higher proportion of their income in tax (see C3).  
 
This means that one of the most important sets of tools on the collection side of 
redistribution is somewhat fuzzy in many people’s minds. 
 
Some people also have other views about these two different types of tax, but 
these vary considerably between individuals:  
? Some prefer income-related taxes because it seems fairer to raise money 
in proportion to people’s ability to pay than to take in money on a flat-
rate basis.  
? On the other hand income tax is a very visible bite out of the paypacket. 
? The ubiquitous and invisible nature of spending taxes is also sometimes 
disliked.  
? There were occasional references to ‘stealth taxes’. 
 
F: “Well, they’re all stealth taxes, aren’t they? That’s what they all are, he’s 
put thousands on” (Shef higher pen) 
 
? There is also some tendency to feel that you have some ‘choice’ about 
paying spending taxes, whereas income tax seems unavoidable2. 
 
F: “The taxes on spending you control yourself – then I don’t have to buy if 
it’s on it, whereas my income will be taxed whatever I do” (Bar high left) 
 
M: “But VAT gives you a choice – if you don’t wanna buy a thing with VAT on 
you don’t buy it. But with income tax, if you earn a certain amount, you’ve 
got to pay it automatically” 
M: “No choice – no choice” 
F: “Yeah, I think that VAT’s better really, you’ve got your choice” 
                                           
2   This is an interesting perception which I’ve come across in other studies. It’s hard to see 
in general terms that people really have more chance of avoiding spending taxes by 
abstaining from spending than they have of avoiding income tax by abstaining from 
earning. Both are possible in theory, but neither seems practicable as a general strategy.  
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M: “But you haven’t – it’s on petrol, it’s on gas, it’s on electricity” 
F: “Holidays – everything” (Shef higher pen) 
 
Some participants argued that spending taxes amount to double taxation – 
you’ve already paid income tax on the money coming in, now you’re taxed on 
the same money as it goes out. 
 
M: “The thing is, you’re taxed on your wages, then you’re taxed on things you 
buy, and then VAT, that’s like three lots really isn’t it? I’d rather just pay 
tax on your wages – more tax on that, and don’t pay tax on the other 
things” (Rug low left) 
 
M: “Part of me would say it’s horrendous that throughout your life you’re 
paying tax on money you’ve already been taxed on” (Bar high left) 
 
A few people suggested introducing a more progressive element into spending 
taxes by taxing “luxuries” more heavily than staples. But where this was talked 
about people couldn’t easily agree what would constitute a ‘luxury’, or where 
the line should be drawn.  
 
M: “Maybe there should be luxury tax where if people can afford to buy 
luxury items then they should be paying more VAT on them items” 
I: “So you’d have some items which you’d increase the rate of VAT on?” 
F: “Like food is zero then put other staple things up to a certain level” 
I: “So what would you class as luxury?” 
M: “Your beefburger 1%, your 12 ounce steak 5%” 
F: “Or even on cars you could go by a certain value, up to about 15 or 20 – 
but once you get to the 60-70, if they can afford to buy and tax a car of that 
value then they could afford to pay more in tax” 
F: “But food-wise if you’re doing that then the poorer people wouldn’t see a 
steak at all” (Rug low mixed) 
 
Different kinds of benefit: Just as taxes differ in character, so in many ways do 
the benefits and services people receive in return for them. 
 
The public tends to think differently about health, education, pensions, other 
forms of Social Security, and so on. This is considered at greater length in C2.3.  
 
An example of this is the extent to which people think differently about the 
application of means testing to different types of service and benefit. Some 
participants favoured means testing child benefit (CB), but no-one made a 
similar argument about education (although these are both benefits applied to 
parents of children), or about pensions (see C2.5).  
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One of the biggest differences in many participants’ minds seemed to be 
between cash benefits and benefits in kind. People do in some senses seem to 
think differently about these. 
 
One feature is that cash benefits have a potentially knowable value. People 
don’t always know the exact amounts, particularly of cash benefits they don’t 
actually get themselves (and occasionally even of those they do). Sometimes 
there are misconceptions, and some seem to exaggerate the value of cash 
benefits in their minds – as when they envisage asylum seekers or others living 
luxuriously at the public expense (see D6). However there is in principle a 
determinable cash value to these benefits. 
 
Conversely there is no cash value attached to health, education or other similar 
services. People are not told what it costs for their children to attend school, or 
to have particular treatments on the NHS. They don’t know what they pay for 
these services – even in general3, and certainly not in a usage-related way. Nor 
do most have in their heads any real notion of a ‘market rate’ which would tell 
them what it ‘really’ costs for hospital treatment or school attendance.  
 
The nearest some people come to this kind of knowledge is if they have private 
health treatment. Apart from those with private health insurance this sometimes 
happens when someone is taken ill on holiday. The cost is often covered by 
holiday insurance, but such patients are often struck by the amount that has to 
be paid. This tends to make them glad they have a free health service, and gives 
them some sense that it is worth a lot to them. However these are exceptional 
cases, and even these give only partial fragments of cost information.  
 
F: “People knock the National Health Service, and I know it’s understaffed 
and there’s a lot wrong, but I was in Spain on holiday in September and I 
had to have an appendectomy – and it was wonderful, and my insurance 
paid for the operation, and that was great. But when I saw how much 
they’d had to pay out – and I thought if it had happened here I would have 
just been taken and given the same treatment” (Shef higher pen) 
 
M: “My daughter at 18 was involved in a serious road accident in America – 
we got a bill for a week’s medical care for £23,000! And fortunately she 
was insured, but had that accident happened here in Britain we would 
                                           
3 
  What you pay for education is in principle knowable in a general way from council tax 
demands, but it seems unlikely from the way people talk that many people would 
generally have this figure in their minds – and in any case it doesn't tell you what it is 
costing to educate your own child or children, since you pay this whether you have 
school-age children or not. What you pay for health is not stated at all on tax demands, 
even in this general way. 
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have reaped the benefits of that through the National Health scheme” 
(Shef higher pen) 
 
One implication of the more typical ignorance of costs is that these services are 
not merely free at the point of delivery, but in a sense costless to the individual. 
That doesn’t of course mean that people don’t think they pay anything, but there 
is hardly any sense of having paid a given amount for a given service.  
 
Supermarket shoppers can see the basket-load of goods they have bought, and 
they know exactly what it has cost them, whether they pay in cash or by card. 
No doubt those who buy private education are acutely aware of how much they 
pay a year in fees, but people who have just sent their child to a state school for 
a year are not particularly conscious of having received a given amount of value 
from the state.  
 
I use ‘value’ here to relate to the perception of receiving a quantum of benefit – 
this is not to do with how much they value the school in the sense of thinking it 
performs well or badly, nor with how much their particular child gets out of 
attending4.  
 
The effect of all this is that many people tend to underestimate the cash value of 
the benefits in kind they receive from the state – simply because they don’t 
know the costs, and aren’t reminded of the various benefits they receive. This 
applies even to the specific services they receive directly (like medical 
treatment), and even more to indirect benefits (like insurance value or freedom 
from worry) or systemic benefits (like living in a kindly, supportive or well-
educated community). 
 
In many ways this low awareness of the cost of services may be desirable – for 
example if it enables people to use the services freely and without getting 
anxious about what it’s costing, which probably improves access to services. On 
the other hand it means that the benefit pan in the mental scales tends to weigh 
light relative to the tax pan. This study suggests that many people are sharply 
aware of the tax system draining money from them (even if they aren’t certain 
about the precise amounts involved), but they don’t have equivalent awareness 
of all the ways in which money flows back to them through services and 
                                           
4   There also is a more subtle set of arguments relating to whether the service is ‘worth’ 
what it costs, supposing you knew what the cost was. People often believe that public 
services are poorly administered, and that there is a lot of waste in the way public money 
is spent. When they were given figures in some of the stimulus materials about the 
benefits people in different income groups receive from the state (see D14) a few people 
were therefore inclined to challenge these. In this sense statements about what a service 
costs may not reflect its value as seen by the taxpayer.  
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benefits. Some were visibly surprised when they saw estimates of the cash value 
of services in Charts N and P (see D14) – sometimes to the point of finding 
them hard to believe. 
 
Participants usually seemed more relaxed when discussing benefits in kind than 
cash benefits. Some expressed anxieties about people getting things they 
shouldn’t be entitled to (see D6), but these tend to relate more to cash benefits 
(although there were some comments about foreigners using the NHS). There 
could be various reasons for this: 
1. As noted above, people seem generally less aware of the cost of benefits 
in kind. 
2. The most contentious field is usually Social Security (see D6), which 
largely involves cash benefits. Payments in cash can be seen as ‘hand-
outs’, but benefits in kind like health and education are not often looked 
at in this light.  
3. Handing over cash projects a more direct and vivid image of resource 
transfers than (say) sending your child to a state school or having an NHS 
operation.  
 
Partly for all the above reasons people do not tend to aggregate all the benefits 
they do (or might) receive from the state, and they don’t tend to think of them 
all as interchangeable entities. Participants were usually able to understand 
information given in the discussions about net benefit flows (see D14), but there 
is not much sign that this is normally the way they would tend to think about it 
themselves. Healthcare, schooling and Social Security are all understood to be 
part of the welfare state, but they are not all normally pictured as the same kind 
of entity. 
 
C2.3 Perceptions of public services 
I found a fairly widespread mood that the public not only pay too much in tax 
but they also get too little for it – two mutually-reinforcing perceptions. This 
difference between what people feel they pay and what they get is often put 
down to supposed inefficiency in the way money is spent, and/or supposed 
misdirection of resources into the wrong types of activity. 
 
M: “I’m paying too much for what I’ve got” (Bar high right) 
 
F: “And that health service thing, if it was run more efficiently it wouldn’t be 
costing us so much” 
F: “It’s the running of the system” 
F: “Definitely” 
F: “Nothing’s efficient” (Bar high left) 
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F: “I just think there’s too much being drawn off of it and not enough being 
put back into it. I don’t think the sums are not right, but I think that it’s 
just used very badly, so the sums won’t work out” (Bar high right) 
 
Although there is a fairly strong perception of being heavily taxed I detected 
more concern with what people get out of the system than what they put into it. 
Given a choice most study participants would rather improve the services they 
get than cut the amount they pay. Indeed some volunteered that they would be 
prepared to pay more if only it would bring the NHS and the education system 
up to the standard they expect. Views on this inevitably differ between 
individuals, but I sense that the centre of gravity probably currently leans more 
towards service improvement than tax-cutting5. 
 
M: “Hospitals seem to have got worse and worse, like the time you wait and 
things. And so somewhere it’s under-funded, somewhere the money’s not 
going to where it should do” 
I: “But again, would you be content with what you’re paying if you were 
getting what you think you should be getting?” 
M: “Yes, I would guess most people would say that” 
I: “So it’s not that you feel you’re paying too much, but you feel you’re 
getting too little for it?” 
M: “Yeah, yeah” 
M: “Yes, generally I would agree with that. In fact I’d probably go a bit 
further and say, obviously depending on how much, I’d be prepared to pay 
more to get a good service. I mean, again, being specific, the state of the 
roads is absolutely atrocious. I’d probably be prepared to pay more to get 
a better service and have things improved” (Bar high right) 
 
M: “If the money is collected, and if it’s spent properly you can’t fault it, it’s 
just that it’s not spent properly” (Shef lower pen) 
 
F: “If I felt it (NHS) was running efficiently I’d pay more tax. If I could 
specify to pay more tax providing it went into an efficiently run NHS I 
would do it, but I would be anti a tax increase if I felt it was just going to 
be wasted” 
F: “Yes, I agree with that” 
M: “But the bottom line is, I bet everyone in this room would say, 
‘Irrespective of what I pay, I deserve to expect the services that you’re 
promising. I don’t mind paying 40% tax, but give me the service’. Equally, 
the man down the road doesn’t mind paying 23/24% tax, but give me the 
service” 
F: “Yes, absolutely” 
M: “Or tell me what I need to pay to get the vital service” (Bar high left) 
 
                                           
5   Some people argue that they should be able to have both – they feel that improving 
efficiency and reducing waste ought to provide better services at less cost.  
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M: “All the taxes taken into account, I would say about the effective rate 
would be around almost 40% if you take into account indirect tax, VAT, 
plus the taxes. For paying that kind of money, the service in general is not 
good. NHS, we had a bad experience when the baby was born. So my view 
is the spending is not efficient. I mean, there are other countries within 
Europe which have higher tax rates, but the service is better” 
I: “If the service was good, and you were pleased with it, would you be 
happy about paying what you’re paying for it?” 
M: “Yep” 
I: “So it’s because you don’t feel the service is what it should be?” 
M: “Yeah” (Bar high right) 
 
M: “At the end of the day what we’re talking about in terms of tax is what 
we’re getting for our tax money, not what we’re paying. That’s the issue. 
Show me the value” 
M: “Quality service” 
F: “Yeah – and we’d pay more, I think, if the services were so much better” 
F: “Isn’t it for anything you buy, you want value for money whether you buy 
a pair of shoes, or a car, or so?” (Bar high left) 
 
The feeling that payments and receipts don’t balance seems to arise in part from 
the fact that most people have a very imperfect and incomplete mental picture of 
what they do actually get out of the system, and the cash value of all the benefits 
and services they receive (see C2.2).  
 
More importantly, however, it arises from a perception that the services 
received just aren’t good enough. People are often critical of the quality of 
health, education, policing, transport and so on.  
 
M: “They’ve paid their whole life and they are British born, and still they are 
upset with the way they are treated in the hospitals” (Bar high right) 
 
M: “I phoned the police up in Rugby, and they turned round and said to me, 
‘Oh we ain’t going to be able to get anybody out to you ‘cos we’re too 
busy’. So what do you pay your poll tax for?” (Rug low left) 
 
F: “The type of things you generally use, the fire, police and ambulance, 
whatever, you just see are being shut down rather than increased” 
F: “If you ring up for the police and they say, ‘We can’t come at the moment’, 
by the time they do come, whatever the problem is, it’s over with. And you 
want them there straight away not two hours down the line – or even the 
next day sometimes they’ve come out, too late then” (Rug low mixed) 
 
F: “I personally think that everywhere they should be spending money, 
they’re not – the health service, the schools, education. Everything seems 
to be cutting, we seem to be getting less than we’re expecting and that we 
need all over the place – I mean look at the fire-fighters – everything like 
that, the people that we really need – police force, the nurses, everyone” 
(Bar high left) 
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There is assumed to be a lot of waste and inefficiency in public spending. 
 
M: “They build a beautiful maternity unit and then closed it two years later” 
F: “It’s really posh and that and the next thing you know they’ve closed it 
down and you can’t have operations or nothing down there now” 
F: “There’s no maternity care there now, you have to go to Coventry. I think 
it’s the futileness of having used all the money to upgrade this from a very 
run down hospital to this huge super-dooper state of the art and then shut 
it” 
M: “It’s a waste, a pure waste” 
F: “It’s like the train station isn’t it, at Rugby? They more or less said it was 
gonna close, then did it all up, spent millions on the roof. And now they 
said they’re gonna shut it and open it somewhere up the road. Build a new 
one completely from scratch” (Rug low mixed) 
 
M: “Across the board – health service, public transport, whatever – it’s the 
culture that’s in there, there is huge wastage. I don’t know the simple 
answer, but we all know if we could really squeeze and see through all 
these grey marginal areas. I bet you’d find a great proportion of this 
money that vital services need being wasted annually” (Bar high left) 
 
F: “I think a lot of money’s wasted” 
M: “I don’t think it is wasted, it’s spent somehow, but not on us” 
F: “I see it wasted. I walk my dog at 6.00 in the morning, before I go off to 
work, and I see three, four people doing absolutely nothing, being paid for 
that time” (Bar high right) 
 
F: “Too much of it is paid out probably at the top, to the people who are 
managing it, then they get kind of quite fat fees, the too many chiefs and 
not enough Indians, probably – or something like that”  
M: “See, we don’t object to any of this, all we object to is waste. If the money 
is going to the right places, nobody is bothered” 
I: “Do you think it’s going to the right places at the moment?” 
M: “I don’t think so, personally” 
F: “I’m sure a lot of money is wasted. I don’t quite know where, but probably 
I think perhaps on keeping too many at the top in very expensive jobs – I 
don’t know, I might be wrong” (Shef lower pen) 
 
Moreover there is also a common feeling that the service situation continues to 
worsen. Some know that the government is spending more, or plans to do so, 
but any beneficial effects from extra spending aren’t yet generally visible. Many 
feel that the cost/service balance is tipping further in the wrong direction – it 
was often said that the public is “Paying more and getting less”.  
 
M: “Things like collecting the rubbish seem to become less and less labour-
intensive, so going back to the year dot, the dustbins used to be emptied, 
they’d come into the garden, take the dustbins, they’d tip onto the thing – 
now you’ve got to put it in plastic bags, put them out by the front gate, not 
even by the front door – it just seems you’re paying more for less” 
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I: “Is that just about rubbish collecting, or do you feel that about a lot of 
other things?” 
F: “No, I think that about a lot of other things – the police have been cut 
back. We had a major issue a few weeks ago – rang the police, really quite 
serious, and in actual fact it took me 20 minutes – because we now come 
under Colindale. Barnet are no longer functional, Whetstone are no longer 
functional. And I very rarely see a policeman now” 
F: “‘Cos what you’re paying is just going up and up and the service is not 
getting any better – or it’s getting worse” 
F: “I pay £20 a week for just me and I think, ‘Well what do I get for that?’” 
(Bar high right) 
 
M: “My mother went into a residential nursing home last September which 
I’ve gotta pay for until most of her money runs out. We received a letter 
the other day when she was originally receiving homecare, support, home 
help, etc, saying the Council are not only gonna put the community charge 
up for this year, they’ve cut 2.7 million pounds off the budget and can no 
longer provide elderly people with shopping services, housework. So we’re 
paying more and getting less for it” (Bar high left) 
 
There were clues that it might take public opinion some time to catch up even if 
quality really does improve in some services. In commenting about NHS 
problems, for example, participants often quoted fairly old anecdotes. Most 
people’s direct interactions with the health service are localised and sporadic, 
and citizens usually depend largely on the media and the grapevine for any 
global appreciation of what is actually happening. These may or may not give 
them a true picture of what is really happening. 
 
Some participants acknowledged that providing good public services is difficult. 
 
F: “The one thing you can say in their defence though is that people are 
living longer. We have a lot more knowledge on how to treat people, and 
therefore they’re not dying as expected when the National Health Service 
was set up. So the more that we progress with heart operations, liver 
transplants, heart transplants – it costs a lot of money, and as much as I 
think that Barnet General and Chase Farm have got one of the worst 
reputations in the country, I do sympathise in a way with the National 
Health Service that it – I think it’s very badly run, but people are just 
going to live longer, we’re just going to have better treatment – and it 
costs a lot of money” (Bar high left) 
 
F: “Like the health system, it’s a bottomless pot, innovation just keeps 
growing and you’ve got to keep up with it all the time – and there’s never 
enough money to keep up with it” (Rug low left) 
 
M: “We’ve had different governments, Labour or the Conservatives, it’s not 
really improved dramatically when either party was in power. So maybe 
there’s something fundamentally wrong, if neither lot can make the sums 
add up – if one party blames the other party for the mess that was caused 
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for it not working, then it must be fundamentally wrong that they can’t 
make a transport system work, or they haven’t got enough money for 
hospitals. So I don’t know why that is because I don’t know enough about 
economics” (Bar high right) 
 
F: “But there is more offered in the way of treatment that wasn’t available 50 
years ago, I mean medicine has progressed, so they can save more lives by 
doing different procedures. That would cost – and obviously cause more 
waiting lists” (Shef lower pen) 
 
The main implication of the above for redistribution is that the public’s minds 
currently seem much more focused on what they get and what it costs them to 
get it than on the way the precise balance of cost and benefit varies between 
individuals (see D2).  
 
Moreover the performance criticisms rarely translate into a desire to move away 
from state provision to some other non-state model. Most people seem wedded 
to the concept of the NHS in particular. They are often concerned about its 
performance, but there is a fairly broad consensus that this is in principle the 
right way to arrange for healthcare.  
 
I: “Is it a good idea to have a health service – by which I mean something 
which is funded broadly out of taxation and national insurance which the 
government pays for and which is free at the point of delivery. Is that 
something you’re sympathetic to, or not?” 
F: “Yes, I’m very much in favour of that. I’m German and I know what 
happens in Germany, and the amount of money they pay into their private 
health insurance – yes, they get a treatment which is slightly faster, but it’s 
not necessarily better, because I know it from source that once you are in 
the system, you get the best of treatment in the health service. I’m totally 
for it, yes” 
F: “If it was run better” 
F: “I think so, yes” 
F: “I was going to say, if it were run efficiently I think I agree with it, I’ve 
seen what happens in the States to people who are on lower incomes” (Bar 
high left) 
 
F: “Thank God for the National Health Service, I must admit about that – 
that’s something we couldn’t do without” 
M: “But where’s the money gone from it all? You get a waiting list now, they 
put income tax up now to pay for hospitals” (Shef lower pen) 
 
America is often quoted as a model to be avoided. 
 
F: “I think if it was private – it is very good in America, but it’s good for 
those who pay, it’s not good for those who don’t” (Rug low left) 
 
F: “It would be like America I suppose, where you can’t get anything” 
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F: “You couldn’t afford it, so they would just not go to a doctor, and people 
would die, ‘cos they can’t afford to – ” (Bar high right) 
 
So people generally want the government to make the NHS work – and so far 
this view persists in spite of a certain amount of pessimism and cynicism about 
whether it is on the road to achieving this. Some volunteered the view that they 
would be prepared to pay more for the NHS in particular if they believed this 
would make a decisive difference to services – although this would not be 
readily believed by many people because of the widespread perceptions of 
waste and mis-direction of funds.  
 
The performance criticisms rarely translate into a desire to move away from 
state provision to some other non-state model. People generally want the 
government to make the NHS work – and so far this view persists in spite of a 
certain amount of pessimism and cynicism about whether it is on the road to 
achieving this. Some people volunteered the view that they would be prepared 
to pay more for the NHS in particular if they believed this would make a 
decisive difference to services.  
 
Many people do not seem to be clear about the cost either of the NHS or of 
private healthcare, but it tends to be assumed that the NHS is less expensive for 
the citizen than private medicine would be. 
 
F: “When you think of what percentage of our income we pay into the NHS, 
it’s relatively small. When I compare it to what they pay in Germany, you 
would be shattered. So for that amount, if you count it per year, it is very 
little and we get quite a lot from it, there are a lot of holes, and 
tremendously big ones, but I’d much rather be in the NHS than privately 
insured” (Bar high left) 
 
C2.4 Attitudes to the welfare state 
People generally support the notion of having a welfare state. Even the 
pensioner groups in Sheffield, who had complained long and bitterly that they 
were not getting a pension that reflected what they had paid in over the years, 
were more-or-less unanimous that they would have been worse off if the 
welfare state had never been introduced after the war, and instead they had been 
able to keep the money they had paid in to make their own provision.  
 
I: “Do you think if the state hadn’t collected the money from you it has in 
taxes, and it hadn’t gone in for the welfare state, do you think you’d have 
been better off if you’d just been able to pay your own way, or not?” 
F: “No – no, I don’t think so, in the long run, no” 
M: “Well, you wouldn’t have been, would you – obviously” 
F: “You’ve got to have national insurance, otherwise we wouldn’t have got 
the pensions we’ve got now – that we’re grumbling about now” 
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M: “When I were little me mum always used to pay a doctor and somebody 
would knock on the door every week and you paid your doctor’s bill. And 
then they brought national health in to – how many of you could pay for 
the operations and everything?” 
F: “We couldn’t” 
F: “Impossibility” 
M: “You couldn’t – we couldn’t afford to do it” 
F: “Even the private insurance would probably be beyond most of us, it 
certainly would be beyond me” (Shef lower pen) 
 
I: “If you could put the clock back and not have a welfare state, and have 
provided for yourselves all these years, do you think you’d be better off 
now?” 
F: “No” 
M: “No, you’d be worse off” 
M: “You’ve got to be worse off” 
I: “It may seem a silly question, but from the point of view of citizens like 
yourselves, why is a welfare state valuable to you?” 
M: “Well, anyone at our age, if you remember when you had to pay for the 
doctors, it didn’t matter how much money you hadn’t got, you’d still got to 
pay for a doctor’s visit. I mean I’ve had a quadruple heart bypass, how 
much would that’ve cost?” 
I: “So in one sense it’s like a kind of insurance” 
F: “It is, yes” 
M: “Well of course it is, yes” 
F: “It’s reassurance as well” 
M: “It’s a national insurance, isn’t it for everybody?” (Shef higher pen) 
 
The main perceived purpose and rationale of the welfare state in the minds of 
most participants is to support people when they need help, and to provide good 
public services, while sharing the cost of doing so fairly according to people’s 
ability to pay. That is likely to be a fundamentally redistributive mechanism, 
both in temporal and interpersonal terms, but this is an incidental rather than a 
primary purpose, and it is not necessarily specifically seen as an engine of 
interpersonal redistribution. 
 
Notions of the welfare state tend to imply a common membership. We all pay in 
and draw out according to established principles. Some people contribute more 
or less because means vary – but in principle everyone “does their bit” as far as 
they’re able. Similarly some people draw more than others because their needs 
are greater – and all of us have periods when we either give or take more, 
because of lifecycle changes or random life events.  
 
M: “Now that’s what the welfare state’s about, there’s nobody’d be left 
destitute if you’ve no money” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “It’s a measure of civilisation, isn’t it – how you support people?” (Shef 
lower pen) 
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That’s often seen as “only fair” – and it’s what the welfare state is about. It’s a 
kind of social contract. No-one actually called it that, but that’s the implication 
of the way many talked about it. This notion raises some questions about 
membership and entitlement, which are further explored in D5 below.  
 
The only common criticisms of the welfare state were that: 
a) Some feel it is not delivering the services and benefits it should.  
 
I: “Explain to me why you think it’s important, having the health service, 
having pensions, having state education and the benefits” 
F: “Because at the end of the day you’ve got to have some money coming in 
from somewhere, so you’ve got to pay it in to get it back. But I think what 
you’ve paid in, it in’t enough what you’re getting back at the end of it, 
when you’ve paid all them years” (Shef lower pen) 
 
b) Some say it is abused by people who take out but don’t bother to pay in 
(see D6). 
 
I: “The principle of that is that everybody pays into it, and people take 
various things out of it at different stages” 
F: “And some people take more out than they should. Well, I think they have 
done over the last 40 or 50 years, I think there’s been an awful lot” 
F: “It’s been abused” 
F: “It’s promoted a lot of idleness. Having watched years and years and 
years of people, young lads perhaps who could get a job who won’t get a 
job, because they feel they might get tuppence less if they work than they 
would if they apply to the state, I think it’s bred a certain sort of 
dependence into people – which isn’t perhaps a bad thing in many cases, 
but you think to yourself, ‘My God, if we hadn’t got that welfare state, 
they’d have been bloody working by now’” (Shef lower pen) 
 
C2.5 Means testing  
Most participants seemed ambivalent but very wary about means testing. There 
is quite a lot of opposition to the idea, but some participants advocated its use. 
The term ‘means testing’ itself tends to be unpopular, but some people favour 
the concept – at least in certain circumstances.  
 
The appeal of means testing is mainly the obvious one – that it avoids the 
problem which arises with universal benefits of resources going to people who 
don’t actually need them (or shouldn’t have them). Means testing is therefore 
potentially a tool of redistribution, in that it focuses benefits more sharply to the 
point of need. This keeps costs down, helps to avoid waste, and stops taxpayers’ 
money going to people who are already too well off to need it. 
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M: “Most probably some of the people who get that don’t actually need it. It 
seems a bit unfair in that sense, that people get money who don’t actually 
need it” (Bar high right) 
 
M: “Why should a man who is say 30 year old with four children on £100,000 
a year get family allowance? Why isn’t that divided amongst the poorer 
pensioners” 
F: “But they pay it back in tax, don’t they?” (Shef lower pen) 
 
M: “Would anybody on 56,000 a year be dependent on a state pension? A 
state pension would be a dinner out on a Saturday night. That man will 
never be on 8,000 – he’ll retire on more than what I got when I were 
working” (Shef lower pen) 
 
The following were prominent among the many objections raised to means 
testing: 
a) It often seems to operate unfairly, because its thresholds discriminate 
between apparently similar cases. Such distinctions can seem arbitrary 
and unfair. Means tests usually cut off close to the ground, so that people 
on the wrong side of the threshold still often seem to merit support. 
Means testing seems not only to cut out well-off people but also to 
deprive some who are still in need. There were many anecdotes about 
people with small amounts of income or savings – just enough to push 
them over the threshold and disqualify them from getting help, although 
their need for help is thought as great as many of those who do qualify. 
Those who are a little further up the income scale also often feel they lose 
by this exclusion, even if they are not in severe hardship. 
 
M: “There was a case on the radio last week – a woman was getting £86 so 
she applied for the minimum income guarantee, which I think was 96, but 
her two daughters were putting £5 each into a bank account for this 
woman, which she declared. They found out, they said she couldn’t have 
the minimum income guarantee because what she was getting with the £10 
was 96!” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “Well, I’ve got a cerebral palsy grandson and my daughter’s husband 
works, because he works she can’t get nothing, because he works it’s 
means tested” 
M: “Yeah, that seems an injustice” 
F: “That’s not fair” 
F: “That is what I call a genuine case” (Shef lower pen) 
 
M: “My father worked on the railway all his life, up to being 65, and when he 
retired he got his old-age pension, plus £3 a month pension from the 
railway, and at that time they were giving butter out to the pensioners, and 
they were getting a little bit of meat. He couldn’t claim it, because he was 
two old pence over the limit, so he couldn’t get it” (Shef lower pen) 
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b) People who have “paid in” or “saved” may lose out in favour of those 
who have not. Those who are disqualified because they have small 
amounts of savings or private pension often feel bitter and cheated – they 
complain that they would have been better off if they had just gone out 
and spent or shirked instead of building up small nest eggs. This strikes 
them as wrong because it seems to penalise thrift and endeavour, and to 
reward idleness and profligacy. 
 
F: “When me dad died she had his pension from British Steel, and because 
she was 8p over on her pension, and having me dad’s pension, she 
couldn’t get no family income support, she couldn’t get nothing. She’d 
have been better off if she hadn’t’ve got me dad’s pension, ‘cos she 
would’ve been able to get help – but me dad had worked for that pension, 
and she were entitled to it. But she got penalised for it” (Shef lower pen) 
 
c)  Means testing substitutes a culture of ‘claiming’ for a culture of 
automatic entitlement. This is seen to have various drawbacks: 
♦ It reduces access to benefits, and also take-up. The pensioner 
groups in particular often quoted official pronouncements about the 
amount of state support which goes unclaimed. 
 
M: “Have you seen it in’t newspapers recently, how many millions and 
millions of pounds there is in the government’s bank account, that 
pensioners haven’t claimed, because they don’t know how to claim” 
(Shef lower pen) 
 
♦ Many people find ‘claiming’ intrusive or humiliating. It seems that 
you have to make out a case why you should get special treatment. 
That in itself makes people feel that they are being treated as 
‘different’. They have to provide ‘private’ information and lay 
themselves open to official scrutiny. The process can make them 
feel helpless or unvalued, and can introduce a sense of stigma. 
 
M: “If you want any help, you’ve got to apply for it, nobody comes 
knocking on your door. And it’s very, very hard – hard” (Shef lower 
pen) 
 
M: “You should not have to beg. It should be as a right” (Shef lower pen) 
 
♦ “Big forms” are felt to be confusing and frustrating. 
 
M: “All these systems are mathematically so complicated that your 
average person loses out, because if they’re anything out the ordinary 
in terms of you’ve got – I don’t know, a disabled child – unless you 
know exactly what you’re entitled to, you’re struggling to get any other 
benefits. And we talk about these 23-page forms – I’ve done my wife’s 
tax return for childminding recently, and I’ve made a claim for my 
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daughter to get some extra benefits for having her eyes tested – and 
they’re unbelievable. Every single page is an exception” (Shef higher 
pen) 
 
M: “When I get to 75, somebody will say to me, ‘You can get some more 
money’, ‘Oh good’, and I’ll get a form, it takes me about four year to 
fill in, I think, ‘Oh bother! I’m not bothered about it’ – and it’s a very 
clever idea with these big forms” (Shef lower pen) 
 
M: “They should simplify it” 
M: “Of course they should, we’re all pensioners. Yeah, because some of 
the people lose out, they don’t claim it – it’s too complex” 
F: “And if you did that then we wouldn’t have all these forms to fill in and 
people would understand the system” (Shef higher pen) 
 
♦ Making it difficult to claim is sometimes seen as a government 
ploy aimed at reducing expenditure – if people are put off claiming 
it cuts the amount the state has to fork out. 
 
M: “This new tax credit for pensioners what they’re bringing in, the state 
department have already said that there’ll be a million people not 
apply. £1,000 a time they’re talking about, all going back to the state 
department because they won’t apply for it” 
F: “Yes, they’ve said a lot of people don’t understand” 
F: “And it’s because it’s not explained” 
F: “17 pages to fill in and a 49-page booklet to read, and it says even the 
legal profession have got a job to decipher it so what chance have we 
got?” 
M: “It’s the same for the people with kids as well, they’re having 
problems with that – if you don’t apply, you don’t get it. And some’s 
applied seven months since and they’ve heard nothing whatsoever” 
F: “The system’s bunged up” (Shef higher pen) 
 
d) Many feel that people should receive benefits they have ‘paid in for’ 
whatever their means. This tends to be strongly felt in relation to 
pensions, for example, although less often in relation to child benefit (see 
below). High earners have in fact paid in more than most, some argue. 
 
F: “They say the people who get a lot of money don’t need it, and perhaps 
they don’t – but after all, they are paying more into the system than 
anybody else, so they’re entitled to get out what there is” (Shef higher 
pen) 
 
e) Some people see means testing as expensive to operate – in principle it 
cuts wastage by improving targeting, but some suspect that in practice it 
reduces the amount left to distribute by increasing administration costs. 
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F: “The bureaucracy, the red tape, all the paperwork – you’re paying 
someone to do all that, and that must cost a hell of a lot more than giving 
us more. It’s very expensive to do, because I’m thinking of the manpower 
and the work that they have to put in, that costs a hell of a lot. So that 
money really could be distributed amongst the pensioners” (Shef lower 
pen) 
 
M: “It probably costs millions to make any type of change, just to restructure 
and retrain people” (Bar high right) 
 
F: “There’s certain things that I think they could cut back on, but to actually 
spend the manpower to specify certain cases, I probably wouldn’t think it 
was feasible” (Rug low mixed) 
M: “Well if it was flat payment, how many civil servants would you get rid of 
for a start? Thousands of them, thousands of them” (Shef higher pen) 
 
f) A few also argue that income tax in itself offsets the ‘wastage’ of giving 
higher earners money they don’t need. They have not only paid more 
towards providing the money, but they will have to give more of it back 
again in tax. Increasing tax rates at the upper end of the income scale was 
sometimes suggested as a better way of dealing with this issue than 
withdrawing entitlement. 
 
As already noted, many participants were disposed to think differently about 
applying means testing to different kinds of benefit and service. In general they 
seemed more likely to favour it for cash benefits than for benefits in kind. There 
were few calls to apply means tests to health or education, which tend to be seen 
as general entitlements which should not depend on income.  
 
M: “There’s a difference between child benefit and education” (Bar high left) 
 
But not all cash benefits were thought equally suitable for means testing. Many 
argued strongly against applying it to pensions, which are often seen as an 
inalienable right which people have bought through their contributions. Some 
don’t feel this way about child benefit however (for example). There is a school 
of thought which would have it withdrawn at least for high-earning families, on 
the grounds that they don’t need it. It is sometimes seen as just providing pocket 
money for wealthy children (or their parents). One might have thought that 
Child Benefit recipients had ‘paid’ for it in the same sense that pensioners have, 
but this isn’t the way it’s usually interpreted. The following extended piece of 
dialogue illustrates the ways in which people’s minds work about this. 
 
F: “Why do we pay child benefit to everyone from the person that lives in the 
multimillion pound house and the person that lives in Mayes Lane?” 
M: “So you need to be means tested, is that what you’re saying?” 
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F: “I don’t really like means testing, but I don’t agree with across-the-board 
child maintenance. It was set up after the war where the man went down 
the pub and drank his wages and the woman had nothing to feed the kids 
on. Those times have changed” 
F: “I teach students who come from households where the home’s worth 
three million – they’re having a private education, they do not need child 
benefit. So I would rather it was means tested, and went to the lower end 
of the spectrum” 
F: “On the case of child benefit, yes, I would say means testing would have to 
come into it. ‘Cos I don’t have children, that’s my choice, I don’t mind 
paying for education through my taxes. I’d pay more for education, but I 
do resent child benefit”  
F: “I think more rich people shouldn’t get it (child benefit), people that are 
living in the big houses don’t need it” 
F: “I’m not saying if you’re poor you’re not allowed to have children but I 
still think if you’re on the breadline, I don’t think you should go ahead and 
have two, three, four, five children expecting the state – ” 
F: “No, I agree with that totally” 
I: “What about something like state pensions then, I mean what would you 
say about rich people getting those?” 
M: “It’s a bit of a different situation ‘cos obviously they pay national 
insurance contributions to pay for that” 
F: “They’ve paid in and also how do you become rich and how long have you 
been paying into it before you become rich, how hard you work to become 
rich, or do you win the pools?” 
M: “Also, by virtue of the fact that they’re affluent people, they’ve made a 
higher level of contribution” 
I: “But that would also apply to child benefit?” 
F: “Yes it would – yes it would, I’m just against child benefit really 
basically” 
F: “Well yes, so am I, because for a lot of people it is a necessity, and for 
others it’s just pocket money for the mother, when you take the very rich 
ones” 
F: “I know children who are getting £40, £50 a week pocket money whose 
parents are in receipt of child benefit” 
M: “Well again, they pay more tax as well” 
F: “Yes, I mean that money could be used so much more efficiently” 
F: “Surely that money could be used for free nursery schools, because that’s 
what’s really needed” 
M: “That really does hurt a lot of people – when we first had our daughter – 
my partner works and basically living in London we couldn’t either of us 
afford to give up work – so you’re automatically accepting the fact you’re 
gonna have to put probably £400-£500 a month personally in, just for 
childcare during the week” 
F: “But if the child benefit was paid for a free access to nursery, or 
kindergarten, or whatever is required, that would surely be a better way of 
spending it” 
M: “Quite frankly, I think people that are more affluent in terms of income, or 
equity, all the rest of it, wouldn’t probably have an issue in not getting 
child benefit” 
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F: “I don’t think they would” 
M: “And if you took that sum of money, and invested it in the vital areas we’re 
talking about across the board everyone must benefit”  
F: “Nursery care” (Bar high left) 
 
Part of the reason why some would means test child benefit seems to be the 
argument that people should take responsibility for having children and not 
expect the state to foot the bill.  
 
M: “The primary responsibility of raising the child is with the parents, so 
when they have the child, so if you are giving it out, then it should go to 
the people who need it, that’s going to make a difference – but on the 
pension thing, it’s like buying another product, an insurance product – if I 
go into the market, if I buy something, I expect to get something for it. If 
you’re not going to give me something back for it then don’t take the 
money from me for it” (Bar high right) 
 
F: “What about those people who are working perfectly hard and who are 
being paid £4 or £5 an hour – are you saying they have no right to have 
children if they wish” 
F: “Yes, they have a right to have children as long as they don’t expect the 
state to pay for them” (Bar high left) 
 
However they don’t generally seem to argue this way in relation to education. 
This is often seen as the child’s right, and/or something which is important to 
society. 
 
I: “You were suggesting that as somebody who doesn’t have children 
yourself you’re completely happy to pay for education but not for child 
benefit. What line do you draw between those?” 
F: “Well I draw the line really, and it’s quite a basic one, if you can’t afford 
children you really, really shouldn’t expect to have them and have the state 
pay for them” 
I: “You wouldn’t apply that to education?” 
F: “No I wouldn’t, but what comes first? Because it is set up and because I 
think a child has the right to be educated – never mind why it was brought 
into the world in the first place and what happens at home, it has the right 
to be educated and education” 
F: “Makes a better world basically” 
F: “Well, hopefully it educates people to be more open-minded and hopefully 
get on in the world, and leave whatever is bad at home, if there is things 
bad at home” (Bar high left) 
 
Only a few participants spoke in favour of means testing pensions. 
 
M: “I think sometimes that there should be a cut-off point when you’ve got to 
a comfortable stage where you can live off that, they should say no, you’re 
not having any more” 
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F: “My ex-husband’s a fire officer and until recently he was getting more 
pension than I was earning full-time. And on that I don’t feel that they 
need to have a state pension as well” (Rug low mixed) 
 
Some of those who are resolutely opposed to means testing pensions argued that 
the winter fuel allowance should not go to well-off people. This appears 
inconsistent – it’s not obvious why this distinction is made.  
 
M: “Like the winter fuel allowance, that’s not means tested, is it? That’s like 
the family allowance. Whatever you earn – you could be a millionaire” 
M: “That is stupid – they should never have it, it’s barmy, a man like Richard 
Branson, 60” 
M: “Anybody, who’s a millionaire or whatever” 
M: “He can have £200 fuel allowance. It’s wrong, it should be for 65 
pensioners” (Shef lower pen) 
 
In one group the case came up of a couple said to be denied cash benefits to 
support their child who suffers from cerebral palsy, because they are over the 
income limits. This was generally condemned as wrong by the group members – 
largely on the grounds of sympathy and the obviously ‘deserving’ nature of the 
case. “There’s no price on suffering”, as someone put it. 
 
Some people would be happier with means testing which just cuts out high 
earners rather than slicing between different levels of poverty. 
 
M: “Say like somebody earning 24 grand, the wife possibly does a part-time 
job, she earns, what, eight grand, something like that a year – but they still 
get £40 a week for their child – why, when they earn that much?” 
F: “Well I’m not even thinking of those, I’m thinking about the ones where 
they’re on 60 or 100 or more” (Rug low mixed) 
 
C2.6 Opting out 
Views differ about the extent to which people should be able to opt out of 
paying part of their taxes if they are making private provision (eg for health or 
education). Even among those who have made their own provision opinion still 
divides. Some said they thought it right to pay into the public purse even though 
they had also paid privately. Conversely some of those in favour of opt-outs 
were not making (or in some cases likely to make) private arrangements 
themselves. 
 
On the whole the balance of opinion among participants in this study seemed to 
be against letting people opt out. Some people took this view even if they 
themselves had paid for private health insurance and/or private education.  
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The issue of opting out sometimes arose in relation to people without children 
having to pay for education. Some argued that they shouldn’t have to pay for 
schooling other people’s children – but this doesn’t seem the general view. 
 
It was sometimes argued that: 
? “It’s their choice” if people decide to pay for private healthcare or 
education – or even if they decide to have children. They should therefore 
bear the extra cost – and should still fulfil their obligations to pay into the 
club. 
 
F: “The rich are getting a bit of a poor deal really, aren’t they?” 
F: “But the higher income probably have private education, private health” 
F: “Yes, they have private education, yet they pay into the education service” 
F: “And the health service” 
M: “That’s their own choice, it’s their own choice” 
F: “That’s why we don’t have kids, but I still pay for education, so I don’t 
mind that” 
F: “I mean we had our son privately educated, yet I paid into the system, but 
that was my choice” 
F: “If you choose not to have children, or you choose to have your children 
privately educated, you should still pay to have everyone else educated” 
F: “Yes, yes, yes” 
M: “That’s right, yeah, definitely, I think” 
F: “Yeah. Well the same as other things, like theatre, culture – I take 
advantage of it a lot, others say, ‘Why should I pay for this, I’m not taking 
advantage of it?’. It’s swings and roundabouts – I pay for things I might 
not have an advantage in, yet I use others” 
F: “It’s lucky that we live in London though because people who pay for all 
those cultural things in the Outer Hebrides don’t really have a lot of 
chance to use them” (Bar high left) 
 
? State services would suffer if they lost the contributions of those who opt 
out (who would probably be high earners and therefore heavy 
contributors)6 – there wouldn’t then be enough money to run the system 
properly for those that need it. 
 
I: “Do you think that’s fair, that somebody should have to pay both if they 
choose to pay privately?” 
M: “No, well if they choose to pay privately then they should just pay 
privately, they shouldn’t have to pay” 
F: “Then you’d lose the top three brackets out more or less wouldn’t you? 
Then there wouldn’t be enough to fund what’s left” 
M: “That’s right, it’s a vicious circle” (Rug low mixed) 
 
                                           
6   This seems an important point, which was not universally recognised by participants. 
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? Opting out would produce a two-tier service, with those able to pay 
jumping the queue, and those not able to pay getting second-class 
treatment. 
? It would violate the principle that those who are better off should help 
support those in need. 
? Private health insurance doesn’t cover all medical needs, so even those 
with private provision may still need to use the NHS in some situations. 
? Private medicine depends on the NHS infrastructure. 
? Taxes are not just about direct consumption, but about helping to build a 
society that benefits everyone (what I have called ‘systemic’ benefits). It 
isn’t only a question of buying personal services – everyone should 
contribute because education is an important social and economic good 
from which everyone benefits, and the availability of free healthcare or 
schooling also affects the kind of society we live in. These societal 
benefits should not be put at risk through letting people opt out. 
 
I: “Do you feel that people who don’t have children should be paying into 
the state, to contribute to education for other people’s children?” 
F: “I certainly don’t, I certainly don’t think that’s fair at all” 
M: “It sounds a bit cheesy really if you say it’s like everybody’s future, the 
future generation. So the better education they get, the better the future 
will be for all of us” 
M: “Moreover, they’ll be paying for the system when they grow up and we’re 
retired and need to claim pension or whatever, so you might say it’s for 
the greater good of all” 
M: “If you have no children, why should you pay for somebody else?” 
F: “Well, I disagree, because they’re the future. It’s all about our country, 
it’s all about being united and it’s all about putting back in, and 
progression in our country, so I do feel – having said that I’ve put my 
children through private education” 
I: “Do you think it’s right that you should have to pay for state education?” 
F: “I’m happy with that” (Bar high right) 
 
? Everyone pays for some things they don’t use, but it’s “swings and 
roundabouts”, because they benefit from other people contributing to the 
things they do use. 
? It would seem unfair to allow people to opt out of education spending 
without letting them opt out of other expenditures they may object to (like 
defence). But the system would become less cohesive if citizens were 
allowed to pick and mix which elements they bought into. 
 
M: “It’d be a bit like saying if you never call the police out you wouldn’t pay, 
or if you never went in hospital” 
I: “So we all have to pay in and we all get out?” 
F: “Yeah” 
M: “You die at 64 and 330 days, you never draw a pension” (Shef higher pen) 
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? Even if you have no children you went to school yourself – and others 
paid for you. 
 
F: “Well, it would be very hard to differentiate between those that have got 
children and haven’t – to sort out how much each one should pay? And 
also, even if you haven’t got children, you were at school yourself, and you 
might have been from a family of seven children, and then your parents 
paid the same amount as somebody with one child, so it’s like swings and 
roundabouts really” (Bar high right) 
 
The first two or three of the arguments in the above list were most commonly 
heard, the others less often. Many people don’t seem clear precisely what 
private health insurance does and doesn’t cover, and not many have thought 
through the social or systemic implications of letting people opt out. Few 
participants had more than one or two of these notions in mind, although they 
sometimes responded positively if someone else in the group raised other ideas. 
 
Conversely the main arguments in favour of allowing people to opt-out were 
usually: 
? It’s unfair that someone should pay twice. 
? It’s unfair that someone should pay for what they don’t use. 
? It would give more people more choice about going private. 
? Going private benefits the state system by taking off the pressure and 
freeing up resources for those that need them. 
 
I: “If you’ve got private health insurance, should you be able to opt out of 
the health service?” 
F: “Yes” 
M: “Yeah, I think so” 
F: “Yes, because if you can afford private health service, use it, and let the 
people who can’t use the National Health Service – and get the waiting 
lists down” 
F: “The thing is then there’d be a lack of money going in” (Rug low left) 
 
In the case of education the issue of opting-out was sometimes raised not merely 
in relation to people who pay for private education, but also in relation to those 
who do not have any children of their own. Again views divided – but again the 
general feeling seemed to be that they should not be able to opt out, for similar 
kinds of reason. 
 
A few people made a converse argument – that those who were allowed to opt 
out of contributing to the NHS because they have private health provision 
should not be allowed to use the NHS at all.  
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M: “Sometimes I think that can be unfair because say like you have a private 
scheme, you’ve got that cushion, but on the other hand if that fails you’ve 
got another cushion, you’ve got another level to fall back on. To me that 
seems unfair, because I haven’t got a cushion to fall on, just the NHS. I 
think sometimes that people should have that taken away from them. If they 
have a private scheme that is all they have. They shouldn’t have to have 
the NHS as well – therefore in turn you shouldn’t pay into it” (Rug low 
mixed) 
 
I suspect that the more people see public services like health and education as 
essentially consumer goods the less resistant they would be to the idea of opting 
out, on the principle that consumers should not pay for what they don’t receive. 
Conversely the more people see these as social goods the more resistant they 
would be to opting out because of the effect on the system and on society (‘two-
tier’ provision, a less well-educated society, economic effects, a less kindly 
culture, and so on).  
 
However, while I believe this is a likely relationship, I found that people were 
inclined to lean towards the individualistic rather than the social or systemic 
perspective. This may partly reflect contemporary values and mores, but it may 
also be that the collective arguments are more complex and elusive than the 
individual arguments. It is easier to see how something would affect you or your 
family than to see how it would affect the system as a whole. Systemic 
outcomes do of course ultimately impact on individuals, but such effects may be 
diffuse and difficult to observe.  
 
C2.7 Hypothecation of taxes 
The British tax system has not traditionally been hypothecated (collected and 
earmarked for specific purposes). Taxes collected by diverse routes normally go 
into a central pool from which the whole range of expenditures are met. The 
public sometimes assume that some taxes are supposed to be hypothecated, 
which sometimes leads to a sense of grievance if this does not seem to happen.  
 
M: “What we’re critical of is how the money collected is redistributed, 
because if everything collected which was for the health service went on 
the health services, and every car tax was for the roads everything would 
be – but it isn’t, everything gets lost” (Shef lower pen) 
 
The most obvious examples are vehicle excise duty and other taxes on 
motoring. There tends to be a pre-supposition that these taxes are meant to be 
collected for the benefit of the motorists who pay them, but are actually secretly 
diverted to other purposes. This notion is often resented. It strikes many people 
as ‘fairer’ if taxes on a specific group of people are spent in their interest, a 
concept which some take as justifying the imposition of the tax.  
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F: “They get £26 billion for fuel and cars [reading from Chart C]” 
M: “And that’s 7%” 
F: “But that doesn’t go into the pot for mending roads and building roads 
does it? It goes into a general pot” (Rug low left) 
 
M: “You pay car tax – that’s supposed to be to keep the roads. Have you seen 
the state of some of these roads round here? They haven’t been touched for 
years, and they’re always digging them up – they’re a disgrace” (Rug low 
left) 
 
M: “And if you look at taxes that you’re paying, the car tax, for instance, or 
the road tax, doesn’t actually get spent on the roads, a lot of it. The 
congestion charge, how much of that is gonna go on public transport?” 
M: “I think everything apart from the money that’s to run the system, it’s all 
getting spent on public transport” 
M: “Yeah, well it should be – and hopefully it will” (Bar high left) 
 
There does not often seem to be a comparable assumption that duties on alcohol 
or tobacco are meant to be spent on drinkers or smokers – they are “just taxes”, 
probably designed either simply to raise money, or (in some eyes) to discourage 
or even punish disapproved behaviour.  
 
National insurance (NI) is another example of a tax which people half believe is 
hypothecated, although accounts differ about precisely what it is supposed to 
cover – the NHS, pensions and perhaps Social Security tend to figure in this. 
One common narrative suggests that NI was set up to fund some or all of these 
services and benefits, but people are unsure whether they are (or ever were) 
funded entirely from this source. Some assume this used to be the case, but 
probably no longer is. However the association of NI with NHS and pensions 
probably makes some people feel better about this particular form of tax, simply 
because these are highly valued services. Some participants wondered whether 
some of the NI income is siphoned off for other purposes, which tends to strike 
them as unfair (again because they approve of the assumed core purposes of NI 
and don’t want to see these diluted). Some people assume that NI is just another 
feeder to the pool of general taxation, but this appears to be a less common (and 
less comfortable) assumption. 
 
C3 Taxes paid by different groups 
In the later stages of the discussions participants were shown some information 
about the taxes people actually pay. First they were introduced to the notion of 
income quintiles7, using chart H. This was usually an unfamiliar concept which 
needed to be carefully explained.  
                                           
7   Quintile groupings were used in preference to deciles in order to limit the number of 
figures participants had to grapple with. The experience of the study suggests that this is 
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H    Grouping household incomes
£678£56,800Highest band
£430£32,0002nd highest band
£311£22,100Middle band
£223£14,3002nd lowest band
£150£8,400Lowest band
Typical 
couple’s weekly 
take-home pay
Average gross 
income per year 
(before tax)
Income band
Let’s divide all households into five equal-sized bands, according to 
income
2000- 2001  
 
Although this was only an introductory chart some people found the quintile 
groups interesting in themselves. There was occasional surprise at the figures – 
particularly at the lower end of the scale. Some wondered how people manage 
to live on household incomes as low as £8,400 (particularly in areas like 
Barnet).  
 
Chart I was then shown to illustrate various aspects of the tax paid by each of 
the quintile groups introduced above.  
 
The second row of this chart shows the average amount of tax paid. This was 
not in itself found surprising – people generally expect to see higher income 
groups paying larger amounts of tax. 
 
But there was indeed quite a bit of surprise and disquiet about the third row, 
which shows tax paid as a percentage of income. People were surprised that the 
                                                                                                                                   
about right – 10 groups would probably be hard to take in. On the other hand there is a 
tension between this desirable simplification and the ability to discriminate – particularly 
at the ends of the scale. For example the top decile is much broader than the pictures of 
‘high income’ that people tend to have in their minds. Participants wanted to be able to 
make separate judgements (say) about people earning £100,000 and upwards. This is 
nearly twice the average for the top quintile group. So while the quintile groupings are 
much more manageable, deciles would come closer to enabling people to make the kinds 
of discrimination that interest them at the top end of the scale.  
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lowest income group pay the highest proportion of their income in tax, and the 
highest income group pay the lowest. The differences are slight, but they run in 
a direction which most people neither expect nor approve.  
 
I    Taxes paid by different groups
Income bands
34%43%51%60%72%Other taxes
66%57%49%40%28%Taxes on income
35%38%38%36%41%Tax as % of income
£20,157£12,222£8,350£5,184£3,452Total tax paid
£56,848£31,996£22,084£14,286£8,425Average gross income
Highest2nd highestMiddle2nd lowestLowest
2000- 2001  
 
They don’t expect it because in this context they tend to have an income-related 
taxation model in their minds, and since they know that income tax rates rise 
with increasing earnings it would seem to follow that the higher income groups 
would pay relatively as well as absolutely more in tax. These figures therefore 
seem counter-intuitive – to the point where some people queried them.  
 
F: “I would’ve thought that (%) would go up with the wages going up” 
F: “But you’d expect it to grow, sort of start at 35” 
I: “You’d like to see the percentage going up across the page rather than 
going down across the page?” 
F: “Well I thought that’s how it went anyway, believe it or not” (Rug low 
mixed) 
 
F: “41%’s a bit high, isn’t it, for them, they haven’t got much left? Very 
high” 
M: “I would have thought it’d have been the other way round – 35% for them 
and 41%” (Shef higher pen) 
 
This pattern also strikes most people as inappropriate. It seems wrong that 
people on lower pay should be contributing a higher proportion of their incomes 
in tax, even if the absolute amounts are smaller. The tax system leaves people 
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who don’t seem to have enough to start with an even smaller proportion of their 
income. 
 
F: “I think that’s disgusting, that lowest rate, I do” 
F: “Being penalised, yes” 
F: “Definitely” 
M: “I would think so” 
F: “As a proportion of their income” 
M: “Well they haven’t got it right, have they, ‘cos the lowest paid’s paying the 
most percentage, for a start” 
F: “That is wrong” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “It doesn’t look fair that the people at the lowest end are paying more – I 
don’t understand why that is” (Bar high left) 
 
M: “It seems topsy-turvy. Well, the lowest paid pays the most percentage of 
tax!” (Bar high right) 
 
People generally feel that a reverse slope would be more appropriate – tax 
should rise with increasing income, as a percentage as well as an absolute 
amount. Participants were hesitant to suggest what the percentages ought to be, 
and there was no time to experiment with getting reactions to different kinds of 
slope. But the general feeling was that the present situation as reflected in these 
figures is not right. The implication is that the highest group should be paying 
more, and the lowest group less.  
 
M: “I’d go to the other extreme and say sting harder the ones that are up 
there earning the millions” 
F: “Well he’s got a good accountant probably, that knows the system like 
these politicians have got” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “It strikes me that those people who are at the lower end are paying a very 
high percentage of their income on tax when in fact £8,000 a year in this 
area is not sufficient for somebody to even pay the rent on a council place 
and to feed their family, even if their family is small. It’s below subsistence 
for anybody who’s got children and therefore they’re put in the situation 
where they probably are going to be in receipt of some sort of income or 
tax benefit” (Bar high left) 
 
M: “I’d still like to see this line even out more, so that the lowest aren’t 
paying 41% of their income – I’d rather the highest earners were paying 
41% of their income. I’d like to see a more progressive system” (Bar high 
left) 
 
M: “These lower bands should come off income tax altogether” 
I: “So they’re paying too much tax?” 
M: “Yeah, at the lowest band” (Shef lower pen) 
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F: “The highest tax band is 40% isn’t it? So even people who earn £200,000, 
they pay 40% – which is not right, is it?” (Bar high right) 
 
Most of the comments about this chart tended to focus on the two outer quintile 
groups, the highest and lowest earners. Some people commented about the 
intermediate groups, sometimes in relation to their own status – but it was 
mainly what happens at either end of the scale which drew most attention.  
 
The reason why the lower income groups are paying such a high proportion of 
their income in tax is explained by the last two rows of percentages, which 
demonstrate that it is the impact of spending taxes (which are not progressive) 
that determines the pattern, and shows why this result is counter-intuitive. These 
rows needed explaining – their meaning is not usually self-evident. It became 
apparent that although participants were already vaguely aware of the difference 
between income and spending taxes (and in spite of the fact that this had already 
been considered earlier in the discussion), not many were ready to leap unaided 
to an appreciation of how this impacts differentially on the various income 
groups, and how it explains the unexpected pattern of row 2 in the chart. 
 
One apparent implication of what people said is that there ought to be some 
shift of emphasis away from spending taxes and towards income tax, since this 
would produce the more progressive slope in relative taxation that people 
seemed to expect and desire. There wasn’t time to go into this option properly, 
however, and some participants were hesitant about endorsing a shift of this 
kind whose full implications they didn’t feel able to digest. This could be 
explored by giving people examples of possible outcomes, but it would need 
more time and material than were available here.  
 
Many participants were interested in the amount people have left after tax – this 
after all is what determines the household’s standard of living and its disposable 
income. This figure is not directly stated in the chart. Looked at from this 
standpoint, what you have left should be a key determining factor in deciding 
what you can afford to pay. If you haven’t got enough left you’re paying too 
much tax, if you’ve got a lot left you could probably afford a bit more. This is 
not to say that people want the various income groups to come out with equal 
take-home pay, but they feel that some account should be taken of the residual 
post-tax amount. 
 
 F: “I think it’s the amount of spare cash you have left that should be taken 
into account, everybody really should be able to have a house, a car if they 
want it, there should be a certain amount of things that people should be 
allowed to have and then taxed on what you’ve got left. I’m not saying you 
earn £10,000 and you want a Mercedes, but you should be able to have a 
similar level of comfort” (Rug low mixed) 
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M: “Look at this total tax paid. The lowest one, that’s near on half their 
wages a year, but if you look at the top one they’ve still got £36,000 to live 
on. So it’s like the poor’s getting poorer, and the – ” 
M: “The rich are getting richer” (Rug low left) 
 
F: “Well, it looks very unfair really, doesn’t it, in a way? The lowest income 
group are paying more out of their living expenses – what they’re left with 
is less than the person who’s the richest” (Shef lower pen) 
 
M: “Well, if I were earning 56,000 a year and were having stopped 20,000 I 
shouldn’t like that, for a start” 
F: “No, but if you were getting 8,000 and you were paying 3,400, you 
wouldn’t like it either” 
M: “No – no, you wouldn’t” 
F: “That’s awful” 
F: “No, I think it’s terrible, isn’t it?” 
F: “That’s worse – at least you’ve got plenty left when you’ve paid your – ” 
(Shef higher pen) 
 
Some people were more sympathetic to the position of higher earners, who may 
have worked hard for their success. “They pay enough”. 
 
M: “I’ve a brother-in-law who’s in business, he started from scratch, he re-
mortgaged the house so that they could start this business and now he’s 
running a good business – he’s ready for retiring, so he’s had a good 
income, but he’s earned that money. Why don’t industry pay more tax? But 
somebody who’s earned it, worked their way up the ladder from shop floor 
to the top, they’ve earned it, they shouldn’t have to pay it because they’ve 
earned it” 
M: “Well, you could put everybody in that class” 
F: “But when you look at this they’ve a better standard of living and a lot 
better way of life than what these people have on the lower end, so the 
standard of living’s a lot, lot better than what somebody is trying to – they 
could go to the shop and go and get a hundred pounds worth of groceries 
from Tesco – this person on the lower wage can’t go and do that every 
week with what they’re going to get” (Shef lower pen) 
 
M: “All living round London, we’d all say, ‘How on earth do people exist on 
8,000 a year?’, but with the best will in the world, the people at the top 
end have to work damned hard to get yourself to that stage in life and earn 
that sort of money. You’re already paying 40% across the board. So with 
the best will in the world you’d love to see an equilibrium – people 
generally who are putting the effort in might not have the wherewithal to 
get the top jobs, but they’re working damned hard – but unfortunately, you 
have to find that money somewhere else, and you cannot expect these 
people up the top to carry it” (Bar high left) 
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Others countered that rich people have accountants who find them dodges or 
loopholes which are not open to poorer people. This implies that they probably 
don’t pay the taxes they should (hence the figures may be misleading) – so 
some argued we shouldn’t feel too sorry for them. 
 
F: “Well, they’ve got accountants and things” 
M: “They’re the biggest fiddlers of the lot. You see if you pay Pay As You 
Earn there’s no way that you can fiddle anything – not like a businessman, 
they can claim this and claim that” (Shef higher pen) 
 
M: “Richard Branson – I bet when I were working I paid more tax than him, I 
didn’t get his money. But I couldn’t distribute my money to non-this and 
that – I didn’t have financial experts to tell me how to get away with it. 
The people such as in that height do not pay tax as what they should do. 
It’s offshore, anywhere” (Shef lower pen) 
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D Perceptions of ‘redistribution’  
D1 What is redistribution? 
Redistribution happens when money paid by some taxpayers is spent for the 
benefit of others. It takes places in two main ways: 
Type 1: Redistribution over time (temporal redistribution)  
Type 2: Redistribution between people and groups (interpersonal redistribution).  
 
Type 1, temporal: Redistribution over time is involved when people pay in at 
some points in time and draw out at other points when they have particular 
needs. This is in some ways analogous to insurance – a small regular spread-out 
payment cushions the risk of an unforeseen, heavy or concentrated expenditure. 
It can cover random or accidental needs (like ill-health or unemployment), 
periodic needs which run in phases (like education or maternity), or lifecycle-
related needs (like pensions).  
 
Potentially people get their money back, because what they take out at times of 
need trades off against what they pay in across their lives. As with insurance 
there may not be a precise balance for given individuals, though – people who 
are ‘unlucky’ take out more than they put in, because they have greater needs, 
whereas others who have fewer needs may pay in more than they take out. 
That’s generally seen as all part of the deal, however – the main point of 
insurance is to deal with this kind of imbalance. The point is also to provide the 
“peace of mind” which comes from the knowledge that you’re covered if 
something goes wrong – which is valuable even if you never have to claim.  
 
Type 2, interpersonal: Redistribution between people and groups happens 
when there is some systematic disparity between what different individuals and 
groups pay in and what they take out.  
 
The disparity has to be ‘systematic’, because there would obviously be more-or-
less random winners and losers even under a purely insurance-based model. 
Almost all my participants would accept the latter – it seems fair and self-
evident that those who are ‘unlucky’ in their health or in other respects should 
consume extra resources, and those who enjoy good health (or are otherwise 
less in need of services) should consume less.  
 
Systematic disparities over a lifetime would mainly include flows from higher 
to lower income groups, but also (for example) from the healthy to the 
chronically sick, and from men to women. In any one year resources would flow 
from working age people to pensioners, but in some of these cases this would be 
an example of temporal rather than interpersonal redistribution.  
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There is a complex interaction between temporal and interpersonal 
redistribution. The reality of the way the tax system works is that people who 
draw out heavily in a given year are being ‘paid for’ by others who are 
subscribing but not drawing out. To that extent the system is actually 
redistributing from the latter to the former group. This means that many 
pensioners would seem like net beneficiaries – they are apt to draw out heavily 
in terms of pensions, other benefits and health, but if they are not earning many 
would contribute little in tax. Yet at other stages in their lives they might well 
have been net payers-in. In terms of redistributing money between individuals 
or households we therefore need to distinguish between short-term flows and 
lifetime flows. Short-term flows imply a degree of redistribution between 
people which would to some extent be self-cancelling if you take a lifetime 
view.  
 
This is a very subtle and complex distinction which most participants were 
nowhere near making spontaneously for themselves, and which they often found 
difficult to get their minds round. ‘Swings and roundabouts’ is a phrase I 
sometimes heard to describe the way the system works, but in practice it is very 
hard to disentangle these intricately-related pieces of fairground equipment in 
this case. 
 
I therefore showed people evidence about the extent of redistribution both on a 
spot and on a lifetime basis (see D14). I found most participants able to take 
these in, but they needed to be carefully explained. Many people did not find 
them easy to absorb, and the full ramifications were not always apparent to 
them.  
 
D2 Approaches to studying redistribution  
I took the view that it would be more useful to study redistribution by 
discussing underlying principles and practices than through semantic 
examination of the word ‘redistribution’ itself. Time pressures in relation to the 
size of the field precluded taking both approaches. I wasn’t sure how many 
people would understand the word itself, or what it would be taken to mean. I 
wanted to get down to the bedrock as far as possible, rather than just ending up 
with knee-jerk responses to the terminology.  
 
With hindsight I think this basic approach was justified, but I’m inclined to 
regret not having found out more about direct perceptions of the concept of 
redistribution itself. This could do with more qualitative exploration in future if 
the opportunity presents itself.  
 
The word itself was hardly ever used spontaneously by participants in 
discussion, although much of what we were talking about is clearly related to it. 
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My sense is that understanding of the term would have been incomplete and 
imperfect. This fits my impressions from the study, but it was not directly 
tested.  
 
A few more knowledgeable or thoughtful people used terms like ‘progressive’ 
in relation to taxation, but few seemed to have thought much about these 
matters in general systemic terms before. If they discuss the impact of the tax 
and welfare system they tend to talk about specific issues which may or may not 
have redistributive components. 
 
Put bluntly, questions about the quality, cost and value of public service 
delivery are very much front-of-mind for most people, but questions about 
redistribution generally aren’t – except for a widespread general notion that very 
high earners could contribute a bit more. It was notable in the discussions that 
people often wanted to talk about public services and their cost, but it was much 
harder to get them talking about redistribution. This is partly because the latter 
involves a much more diffuse and difficult set of issues, but also because it is 
usually a more remote concern, which currently has very little emotional head 
of steam behind it. I sense that people in pubs would sometimes talk about the 
perceived shortcomings of the NHS, the difficulties of getting the police to take 
notice of your burglary, the unreliability of the trains, rising council tax, taxes 
on motorists, and so on. I don’t get the impression that they would often be 
talking about redistribution.  
 
I: “When you’re paying into public services people are putting in and taking 
out different amounts” 
M: “I think that’s fair enough, we’ve all said that’s fair enough. I think it’s the 
quality of public service. So it’s about management really, management of 
public services – it’s not really an issue of money” (Bar high left) 
 
The exception to this is where redistribution involves high-profile and emotive 
issues like benefits for asylum seekers or people who won’t work. Here the 
steam pressure can be very high for some people (see D6). The public doesn’t 
tend to identify these primarily as issues of redistribution, and the more general 
underlying basis of redistribution within the system does not currently seem 
salient in people’s minds – or indeed very perceptible.  
 
I have some sense that what would normally be understood by ‘redistribution’ 
tends to be Type 2 (interpersonal) rather than Type 1 (temporal). The latter 
notion is in part a familiar feature of welfare state provision. The element of 
‘insurance’ inevitably involves ebbs and flows across the lifecycle, but this is 
not necessarily normally regarded as ‘redistributive’ – because of the ‘swings 
and roundabouts’ notion it is seen as potentially self-cancelling (what you pay 
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in today you get back tomorrow). However, this is an impression rather than a 
firm conclusion, because I didn’t explore the semantics directly in the sessions.  
 
The obviousness of the redistributive effect varies between different types of 
benefit. It is perhaps most manifest with cash benefits – particularly working-
age benefits like those paid to unemployed people. With pensions the 
redistribution across individual lifecycles to some extent masks the 
redistribution between higher and lower earners (“the pension I’m getting is 
what I’ve paid in for all these years”) – see D9.  
 
D3 Reasons for supporting redistribution  
As already noted in C2.4, participants did recognise that some individuals put 
more into the welfare state than others, and that some take more out. That is 
widely regarded as part of the basic deal, because some people need more help, 
and some can afford to contribute more. It most obviously happens across the 
income scale. Insofar as most people have an organised concept of 
‘redistribution’ I suspect that is largely what it would be.  
 
This principle was widely endorsed among participants (albeit subject to certain 
caveats and within certain limits). The main reason advanced for supporting it is 
as stated above – that hardship should be alleviated in times of need, and that 
the cost of doing this should be spread in proportion to what people can 
reasonably afford. Some people also feel that a compassionate and mutually 
supportive society is desirable in itself. 
 
There were inevitably some differences between population sub-groups defined 
by income, political leanings, and lifestage, but in the main these variations 
were surprisingly small in relation to the core agenda. Redistribution tended to 
be endorsed by all segments, often with similar criteria and caveats. Support for 
shifting the tax burden upwards was by no means confined to low-income 
groups.  
 
There was not much evidence that support for redistribution is driven primarily 
by an egalitarian agenda, although elements of this could sometimes be 
detected. That’s to say people do not usually seem to be starting from the 
premise that there is too much economic inequality, and that it is the function of 
the tax and welfare system to even it out. Any progressive redistribution across 
the income scale will tend to have that effect to some degree, but that didn’t 
usually seem to be the primary objective. The most common idea is to make 
sure that: 
? everyone gets what they need to live comfortably and avoid hardship 
whether or not they have enough money to pay, and 
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? the cost of achieving this is fairly borne and reflects people’s ability to 
pay. 
 
Given that both means and needs vary between individuals and families this 
necessarily implies redistribution – but that is not usually felt to be the key 
objective in itself, it is more a means to an end. It is redistributive in effect, but 
not necessarily specifically redistributive in intention. Participants did not 
usually analyse it clearly in these terms, but this seems the general drift of what 
they said. 
 
The main exception to this is where some people are seen to have excessively 
large incomes (the ‘fat-cat’ image), in which case some feel there is intrinsic 
merit in trimming their earnings down a bit, quite apart from expecting them to 
contribute proportionately to the public purse. I suspect that some people would 
favour an element of redistribution in its own right at both extremes of the 
income scale. Poverty should be alleviated, and excessive incomes are often 
criticised. However these matters were not fully explored, and there would 
probably be some dissent. 
 
Insofar as there are general guiding concepts they seem to be ‘fairness’ and 
‘mutuality’, which are further explored in D5. Different people sometimes have 
different notions about what is and isn’t fair (particularly at the level of detail), 
but there is often a degree of consensus. ‘Fairness’ often tends to involve an 
element of redistribution, but this can seem unfair if it is carried too far or 
operates in what seem unreasonable ways. 
 
Some study participants did express more specifically egalitarian views, but 
these were comparatively uncommon. 
 
M: “If the gap between rich and poor has got greater over the last 15 years 
probably the balance isn’t right, maybe there should be more progressive 
taxes… I want a progressive tax – I’d rather live in a more equal society 
where there’s not such a gap between rich and poor, I’d like the gap 
between the rich and the poor to be less rather than more. I’d rather 
someone who’s earning a lot less money was paying less tax” (Bar high 
left) 
 
With hindsight it might have been useful to show people information about the 
widening gap between rich and poor, to see whether or not they would interpret 
this as in itself a case for greater redistribution. As it was few people brought it 
up spontaneously, and it was not probed. 
 
Again it is important to stress that the perceptions described above often 
emerged only gradually from discussion as people grappled with the issues. 
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Participants did not often come along with thought-out views about these 
matters which they were ready to articulate from the outset. 
 
D4 Different pictures of redistribution 
There are clues that the public tend to be least comfortable with redistribution 
when they picture it as a direct transfer of resources between individuals or 
social groups. They tend to be more at ease with a model which portrays a 
central pot (or pots) which everyone pays into and draws from in varying 
amounts according to needs and means. By implication if the amounts put in 
and taken out vary between individuals then there is a transfer of resources 
between them – but it is an indirect transfer. This does not feel quite the same as 
a situation where A makes payments directly to B.  
 
The latter direct payment model does not in practice occur, but it can be a way 
of picturing things. It seems more likely to be applied to cash benefits, but can 
relate to any kind of state support. 
 
One notable example in the study was in the Barnet area, where many people 
had the notion that a very dramatic rise in their council tax was due to money 
being given to poorer areas in the north (see D13). In this case very graphic 
images of money being directly transferred from their pockets to people in other 
areas seemed to aggravate their indignation. They didn’t necessarily literally 
think it was happening in exactly this way, but this is how they tended to 
rationalise it to themselves.  
 
It may be argued that the financial outcome is much the same either way, but 
the emotional tonality is somewhat different – and it tends to be the emotional 
reaction which principally shapes people’s views about redistribution.  
 
D5 Concepts of ‘fairness’ and mutuality 
Insofar as I could detect underlying principles in relation to redistribution (and 
indeed to many aspects of the way the tax and spending system operates in 
general) they seemed to be ‘fairness’ and mutuality.  
 
At various points in the discussion participants argued that it is ‘fair’: 
? That the healthy majority should help to support those whose health is 
poor 
? That people who can afford more should pay more 
? That those who succeed through their own efforts should be able to enjoy 
the fruits of their success 
? That people should not be left in hardship even if they have not pulled 
their weight 
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? That those who have made an effort and paid their dues should be 
rewarded for that. 
 
Conversely it was suggested as unfair if people: 
? Are given public money that they don’t need 
? Have to pay out money for essential needs that they can’t afford 
? Who haven’t paid in should be given as much as (even more than) those 
who have 
? Aren’t allowed to enjoy the fruits of their own enterprise, talents, 
education etc.  
? Have to pay for things they don’t use 
? Don’t get what they’ve paid in for 
? Miss out on support because they’re just on the wrong side of an arbitrary 
threshold 
? Are penalised by losing entitlement for saving and being prudent 
? Are penalised for being honest  
? Are penalised for working all their lives by getting no more than those 
who have not worked  
? Are penalised for being married. 
 
M: “Well, I don’t think it’s fair to bring them up to luxury level when they’ve 
paid nothing” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “My mother-in-law went into residential care and the whole income from 
a house that was sold went into her care – which we don’t grudge, but it 
seems unfair when some people don’t contribute” (Bar high left) 
 
F: “My husband’s contributed for 45 years, and why should I be penalised 
‘cos we’re married? Everybody knows somebody who’s cohabitating. They 
get two lots of money. ‘Cos we’re married we don’t get anything” 
M: “Yeah, but people are doing this purposely though these days” 
F: “Of course they are” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “That’s another thing I think’s unfair meself – because you’re wise 
enough to save your money and use it sensibly and let it build, why should 
you lose out on Family Tax Credit just because somebody else didn’t want 
to save theirs, and spent it all, and has got no savings? Why should they 
get the help when you can’t just because you saved your money? 
Obviously if you was a millionaire, won the lottery or something, fair 
enough” (Rug low mixed) 
 
All these things were said in the study, and some of them recurred frequently. 
Others could be added to the list. I suspect that many such postulates would 
command wide support – they all sound very reasonable, and it’s hard to quarrel 
with them, taken individually. The difficulty is that widely-endorsed desiderata 
like these often conflict with each other when applied to real-life tax and 
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welfare issues. For example the idea of rewarding people who have paid their 
dues tends to conflict with the notion that even those who haven’t pulled their 
weight shouldn’t be left in serious hardship. A fine balance needs to be struck in 
such cases. 
 
F: “I’m quite happy for people who are on low incomes to be helped out” 
F: “Yes” 
M: “Oh yes, I am” 
F: “I’d hate to see anybody – but if you have saved, why should you be 
penalised for your savings?” (Shef higher pen) 
 
Trade-offs and priorities therefore have to be established. It seemed from the 
study that this process of debate and trade-off has not got very far in many 
people’s heads. The issues are intricate and difficult, and the public does not 
usually have much real information to work on. Moreover, although particular 
issues may surface in public debate from time to time there is not often scope or 
incentive to progress such ideas very far.  
 
There are not only conflicts between individuals who hold different views but 
(at least as commonly), between different sets of values which co-exist within 
the same head. Different cases or situations (or different ways into discussing an 
issue) sometimes throw different principles into relief.  
 
What we therefore generally have is a rough-and-ready set of acceptable but 
potentially conflicting and largely unreconciled notions of fairness. Dissent 
often arises when different people latch on to different elements and treat them 
as over-riding principles. 
 
The other general principle often applied to redistribution is what I have called 
‘mutuality’8. This term was not actually used in the discussions (unlike 
‘fairness’, which came up all the time), but it seems a useful way of 
summarising an inchoate but powerful nexus of ideas. The system is fair even if 
some people pay in or take out more than others, so long as everyone shares the 
same basic rights and responsibilities. The core of this is that everyone has to 
pay in what they reasonably can in the light of their means, and this entitles 
everyone to draw out what they reasonably need in the light of their 
circumstances (see C2.4).  
 
                                           
8   The term ‘mutuality’ was never used by participants, but I have chosen it as a label for the 
underlying principle I felt they were often trying to express. However, it would be wrong 
to imply that many have this concept neatly packaged in their minds. It usually seemed to 
be an underlying set of dispositions rather than a coherent front-of mind concept.  
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The result is not equality in what different people pay and what they draw, but it 
involves a balancing sense of mutual rights and responsibilities. So long as 
proper mutuality is preserved the system is potentially seen to operate fairly – 
although there is often disagreement about how the rules should be drawn to 
effect a proper balance. For many participants it seemed to be mutuality more 
than equality that legitimates redistribution.  
 
In this view mutuality implies a sort of ‘club’ or social contract. If you are a 
member you have to abide by the rules – and if you aren’t a member you aren’t 
entitled to the benefits.  
 
There are (as it were) two moral bases for the notion of entitlement:  
? You’re entitled because you’re in need (‘Samaritan’ model) 
? You’re entitled because you’ve paid (‘membership’ model) 
The proper balance between these two criteria underlies much of the 
disagreement about how the welfare system ought to work. What you think is 
‘fair’ depends largely on this.  
 
The Samaritan approach tends to be inclusive, and stems from broad 
humanitarian feelings. It suggests that we have a responsibility to people in 
need, which does not depend on them being members of our club or having paid 
their subs, or even being ‘deserving’ cases. This is, for example, the impulse 
which often makes people feel that treatment or support should not actually be 
denied even to those who don’t meet the membership criteria.   
 
The membership approach is in some ways more exclusive. It depends on 
mutuality. Members of the club undertake to help each other out providing they 
all abide by the rules and pay their dues. The purpose of the welfare state club is 
to support each other in times of need, but the undertaking does not extend 
much outside the club.  
 
In the real world these two distinct approaches overlap considerably. The club is 
itself motivated by a mixture of self-interest and Samaritan feeling. The balance 
varies between individuals, but both are present. 
 
The more anxious people are about fraud, abuse or unrestricted use of club 
benefits by outsiders the more inclined they are to take a membership approach, 
and to interpret it more strictly. The membership model is considered further in 
D6 below. 
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D6 The welfare ‘club’ model 
In D5 I suggested that the model of a mutual-help club is a useful metaphor for 
aspects of the public’s notions of redistribution. This concept needs a bit more 
unpacking. 
 
In many eyes the benefits should normally only be available to people who are 
participating members of the club and who have paid their dues, as discussed 
below. 
 
D6.1 A British club 
To begin with the club is generally seen as a British club, the contract is a 
contract between British citizens. It doesn’t cover everyone in the whole world 
– the rest of the world doesn’t contribute (although it may or may not have 
schemes of its own), and isn’t therefore entitled to draw on the benefits9. In this 
view redistribution within the welfare state is basically a British affair, and 
therefore only British citizens are members10. Some people get very ratty at the 
idea of outsiders coming to siphon off the benefits of a system they haven’t 
taken part in or contributed to.  
 
M: “I believe in a welfare state that does actually – ” 
F: “Not for the world though, is it?” 
M: “Well no, let’s say in Britain to start with” (Shef higher pen) 
 
Once the focus moves outside Britain the rules change. ‘Foreigners’ do not 
belong to the club, do not contribute to it, and hence are not entitled to benefit 
under the principle of mutuality. In most people’s eyes those who come to live 
in Britain and function (at least de facto) as citizens thereby become members of 
the club, and few would suggest that their entitlement should be restricted 
because they didn’t pay subscriptions in earlier years. But the sticking point for 
many participants comes where people are thought to be climbing on board the 
gravy-train at the last minute for opportunistic reasons, simply in order to get 
the benefits, but without accepting the obligations.  
                                           
9   A few people mentioned reciprocal arrangements like the EU’s E111. Where mentioned 
this was seen as a reasonable two-way deal between analogous systems which satisfies 
‘fairness’ and ‘mutuality’. 
10   There could be intricate ‘membership’ questions developing within Britain since 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland now have Devolved Administrations (DAs). If the 
DA tax and spending systems were seen to be sufficiently decoupled then the English 
might start seeing England rather than Britain as their ‘club’. However, this was not 
examined in this research, and there is no evidence to suggest it has so far happened to 
any great extent. The current situation is probably that people tend to think of all British 
citizens as members of the same welfare club, and it’s not at all clear yet how far (or how 
quickly) that might fragment.  
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The two archetypal examples of this which are usually quoted are: 
? People who come to Britain when they need an operation just to make use 
of our free healthcare. This is seen as fairly common, and is often 
deplored as an abuse which leaches precious resources away from proper 
members of the welfare club – whether the visitors come from America 
or from poorer countries.  
? “Asylum seekers”, who are sometimes believed to be coming to Britain 
just to enjoy benefits to which they haven’t contributed. 
 
F: “Lots of people come from abroad to use our system – that I don’t agree 
with. There isn’t sufficient for us to. I’m not being disrespectful to the 
people that live here, but a lot of people just come over – I’ve got a friend 
in America – she actually comes over here to have eye operations, and I 
think that is wrong. I don’t agree with people from overseas – if they come 
over and they pay privately, then that’s different” (Bar high right) 
 
F: “Well, it should be people who have actually contributed – some might not 
have contributed for a very long time” 
F: “So if you’re mentally ill and you’ve never worked, you’ve never 
contributed you should still get treatment” 
F: “Yes, because you live here – but people who just come and take 
advantage of our health service – this, I think, is wrong” 
F: “And Housing Benefit and everything else that goes with it” 
F: “I don’t mind people from the Continent when they come here, because I 
take the E111, and I go to Germany and I fall ill and I get treatment – and 
we’ve had treatment there. But this is an arrangement between the 
countries in the EC” 
F: “I think Britain is seen as being a soft number” (Bar high left) 
 
F: “There’s an awful lot of people coming in. They don’t go to other 
countries, it seems to be Britain that most people aim for” 
M: “As long as it says ‘Seeking asylum’ that’s it, you’re in. Then you wait for 
your passport” 
F: “Or you get these families coming across with about 20 of them and 
suddenly they’re given five-bedroomed houses, and ‘Come and stay here 
and we’ll look after you’” 
F: “That I think’s unfair, when they come over and they house them, give 
them furniture everything. Then there’s people, like my daughter with a 
baby, and she can’t even get a house to save her life and she’s having to 
live with me. And her husband’s living with his mother, they’re living 
apart and they can’t get nowhere” (Rug low mixed) 
 
M: “It’s the asylum seekers. . . They keep coming over here, right, why should 
we have to pay for them? We’ve got enough homeless – it’s time they 
called it a day. I’m not racist or nothing, but this is a small island, we’ve 
got enough of our own people, we don’t want no more, but they come over, 
you’re paying for them all the time, houses and all that – and half of them 
are not going to get work anyway” (Rug low left) 
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Disputes about where the boundaries should be drawn again tend to arise in 
relation to asylum seekers, a somewhat stereotyped issue which often arouses 
passions. On one side of the argument these are seen to be people who may 
have suffered and who deserve our help and compassion. On the other side they 
tend to be portrayed as opportunists who are trying to take advantage of our 
generosity by tapping a welfare system they have not contributed to – they are 
not paid-up members of the club.  
 
Such people are not seen as entitled members of the club, at least ab initio. 
Some think they do in practice get pretty free (and generous) access, and they 
object to this – sometimes vehemently. The worry is partly that universal 
entitlement would throw on to the British taxpayer an unsustainable welfare 
load, thereby depriving bona fide club members who have paid their dues. This 
in turn strikes some people as unfair – why should club members pay at all if 
others can come and get the same entitlements for nothing?  
 
F: “ I would like those people who have actually contributed through their 
earnings to be paid, but those people who just come into the country – OK, 
if they come from the EC where there is an arrangement, but there are 
people coming from far away – they live here in big families, and they just 
take – and people like you, who’ve paid and paid and paid, you can’t get 
it. And that I object to” (Bar high left) 
 
M: “If they came over here and have an accident, it don’t cost them a penny, 
we’re paying for that, and it’s something that we’ve paid into since – what 
is it, 1947, something like that” (Shef lower pen) 
 
Overseas aid is in a sense redistributive in effect, but it does not fall under the 
‘mutuality’ umbrella and stands outside the workings of the welfare state. 
Helping poor people in developing countries may seem to parallel helping poor 
people in Britain on the ‘Good Samaritan’ level (although views about that 
diverge sharply on the ‘charity begins at home’ dimension), but this is not 
generally seen as the same kind of activity from the point of view of club 
membership (see D5). A distinction is perhaps being made between ‘charity’ 
and ‘mutuality’ (although certainly no-one expressed it like that). Similarly 
asylum seekers, immigrants, foreign visitors and ‘health tourists’ are not usually 
seen as paid up members of the club.  
 
A few people questioned why we should be giving overseas aid at all instead of 
providing more help for our own disadvantaged. The phrase “charity begins at 
home” was again sometimes heard in this context. 
 
D6.2 Paying your dues 
Apart from whether they are members of the club at all, the other qualifying 
feature of the contract in many people’s minds is whether a member has paid 
 61
their dues. This doesn’t mean how much they’ve actually paid, but whether 
they’ve made a reasonable effort. If you’re ill, having children or genuinely 
unable to get work then it’s part of the deal that you get supported and aren’t 
expected to pay in while that’s happening. But many people would argue that if 
you’ve just opted out or haven’t bothered to get a job you haven’t kept your side 
of the bargain and therefore shouldn’t expect the rest of society to keep its side. 
In this view mutual entitlement implies mutual obligations. 
 
M: “Too many people take the Michael I think. For example, sometimes 
people will split up for the sake of splitting up, and claiming benefits from 
different houses, and still say they’ve got their child with them on either 
end – but they’ll be both claiming still” (Rug low mixed) 
 
F: “It’s horrible for me to say it, but I’m a hard-working mum who earns my 
money and pays my tax, and pays for everything – my poll tax, everything, 
my electricity, everything I have I pay for. Now I’m working in council 
premises where the people play the system – they don’t go to work, they 
have a life of luxury, they don’t pay for anything. Everything is supplied 
for them. And I’m sometimes thinking to myself, ‘Who’s the mad person 
here?’” (Bar high left) 
 
M: “I know a lad, he ain’t worked since the age of 21, he’s 37 now and he’s 
got five kids, and he gets over £1,300 a month off the dole and off his child 
support and everything – and he’s turned round and says, ‘If somebody 
pays me over £1,300 a month, I’ll go and work’, ‘cos he knows for a fact 
that no-one would. So he just sits at home all day on the dole – and there’s 
people like us who have to pay for it” (Rug low left) 
 
One difficulty with applying a principle like paying dues is that it is largely a 
matter of supposition whether or not benefit recipients have contributed what 
could be expected of them – certainly in the aggregate case, but even at the 
individual level. The following comments by an epileptic woman hint at how 
this might look from the recipient’s viewpoint. 
 
F: “From the age of 16 when I left school I’ve always tried for a full-time job, 
nobody will ever let me have one. The moment they know I’m epileptic and 
have quite a few, even though I get warnings, I’ve never got a full-time job. 
The job I do now I’ve only been there four years, it’s only part-time but it’s 
better than nothing. It’s the only job I’ve ever got. But by the time I 
become an old-age pensioner, because I haven’t had a full-time job and I 
haven’t paid into all these schemes I’m gonna get the most diddiest 
pension going. And yet I didn’t ask to spend my whole life not getting a 
full-time job” 
I: “What do you think should happen then in a case like this, how should it 
work?” 
F: “Well, if things are means tested and they look at people as individuals” 
F: “Well, if there’s an extenuating circumstance or something that can be 
proven – I mean you can be medically proven” (Rug low mixed) 
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Many people assume that a good deal of freeloading goes on, and this is often 
supported by anecdotes about those who have no intention of working, claim 
what they aren’t entitled to, and so on. Sometimes the anecdotes seem to relate 
to deliberate fraud, sometimes just to a supposed laxness in the system that 
allows people to claim without challenging their entitlement. There seems as yet 
to be limited public awareness that changes in the benefit system like 
Jobseekers Allowance now embody a more challenging approach to 
unemployment (and participants were sometimes sceptical about its likely 
effectiveness when this point was raised).  
 
A few participants pointed out that there is a lot more publicity about 
overclaiming and fraud but much less about underclaiming of benefits. 
 
M: “DSS were chasing what was said to be seven million pounds of fraudulent 
claims over the year, but what they didn’t publish was that there was two 
hundred million pounds unclaimed because people didn’t know how to 
claim, they’re so complicated” (Shef higher pen) 
 
D6.3 Strength of feeling 
Both the above issues (national membership and paying your dues) sometimes 
engender considerable heat, for a whole range of reasons: 
? People fear that the costs will swamp the system, and club members in 
good standing will lose out. 
? It seems unfair if those who haven’t paid in seem to get more than those 
who have 
? They feel they are themselves paying to support ‘undeserving’ cases. 
? Allowing those who have not paid their dues to enjoy the benefits appears 
to penalise the conscientious and thrifty in favour of those who are 
dishonest, feckless or lazy – which strikes people as morally wrong as 
well as unfair11.  
 
M: “If you’ve got a house they’ll take it off you to pay for it, where them that’s 
paid nothing again, get it all free” 
F: “There’s a lot of bitterness, a lot of bitterness about”  
M: “I can’t see that it’s done fairly in most cases because the people that’ve 
helped themselves in the first place are getting penalised for others that’s 
done nothing” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “If you’ve worked all your life, been taxed all your life, and put a little bit 
– just gone without a few little things, because you think, ‘Right, I’ve got to 
                                           
11   The same thing is often said about disallowing benefit claims where people have small 
amounts of capital. The argument is that thrift is a virtue to be encouraged, but is being 
penalised in favour of those who have been reckless or prodigal with their means. This 
sometimes arouses moral indignation. 
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think about my retirement’, because you’ve saved some money and put it in 
that bank, you’re penalised. And that shouldn’t happen, that should not 
happen! You shouldn’t be penalised for saving. Like me, we worked, we 
didn’t go out every night like a lot of the young ones do now – and I tell 
you, when they get to 65, they will get everything that’s coming to them, 
because they’ve nothing in the bank” 
M: “It’ll be thrown at them” 
F: “But because you’ve been steady, and you’ve saved, and you’ve thought, 
‘No, I’ll go without that, and I’ll do this’, because you’ve done that, you’re 
penalised – and that is wrong” 
M: “It’s a fact – it’s very unfair” (Shef lower pen) 
 
F: “My husband worked from 15 until 60 and got £52 for it, and we’re 
reading in the papers what people are getting after not paying a ha’penny 
in income tax” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “Believe me, if there’s anything going, she’ll get it ‘cos she knows the 
system and she’s lived on it for years” 
F: “And they milk it, don’t they?” 
F: “None of the family work, and none of her sons work” 
M: “We resent it – and yet in actual fact it’s an entitlement – ‘cos we’re all 
entitled to it” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “I think the welfare state is quite easy for some” 
M: “Yeah, it’s too relaxed, that’s why you have God knows how many people 
coming into this country because they see it as a golden opportunity to rob 
the state – because it’s so easy. And I know lots of foreign people that I’ve 
worked with in the past and they’ve said how easy it is to come into this 
country, to get on the bandwagon, to get money off the state and live off it 
the rest of their lives – and not worry about going back. And they can in 
turn feed their family abroad” (Rug low mixed) 
 
Discussion of Social Security benefits in particular tends to be characterised by 
conflicting and sometimes violent emotions – sympathy for those who are truly 
disadvantaged warring with suspicion and anger about others who may be 
suspected of just looking for an easy ride at the taxpayer’s expense. The latter 
feeling is often fuelled by apparently exaggerated folklore and anecdotes about 
the perceived generosity of the benefits paid and the apparent ease with which 
they can be claimed by people who shouldn’t really be entitled. Much of the 
hostility about asylum seekers also seems to have this kind of origin. The 
following extended dialogue illustrates aspects of this. 
 
I: “Take another case – a young woman who’s a single parent, she’s got a 
couple of kids, she’s never worked so far, she’s still fairly young, she’s 
been having children all the time. What about in her case – she’s not put 
much in?” 
M: “Has she had the kids to order? That’s what I think” 
F: “Is she married or just anybody’s kids?” 
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F: “No, she’s young, she’s a single parent” 
M: “Why is she single, has she lost her husband?” 
I: “Would that make a difference?” 
F: “Yes. But they’re having children just to anybody. They’re getting a house, 
they’re getting the furniture, they’re getting kept” 
F: “That’s when it started when they were being given a house” 
I: “So that you wouldn’t think is fair? But you think it’s fair if the husband 
had died or she’d been deserted?” 
M: “Yes” 
M: “I think they should do like America does when they get welfare for one 
kid and if they have any more they get nothing extra – that’s what I think” 
F: “I do, I agree with that” 
M: “This is the lower end as well, of course, what does this kind of thing – 
they’ll have a houseful of kids” 
M: “How do you draw lines, how do you make distinctions like that? How do 
you say this girl doesn’t deserve it, this one does?” 
F: “Well they can’t, they can’t” 
M: “Well you can because if they had more than one child they don’t get any 
extra pay – it’s simple” 
F: “People who come into the country, they’ve got two behind them, one in 
the pram, one in here” (Shef higher pen) 
 
The upshot tends to be that although some take a more relaxed attitude, many 
people feel that full entitlement to welfare benefits should depend on being 
participating and paid-up members of the club. This is not seen to be what 
happens at present – those who express these concerns tend to feel that the pot is 
left open for anyone to dip their hands into. Some would like eligibility rules 
tightened, and many feel that those who have paid their way ought to get some 
advantage from it, even if humanity dictates that even ‘non-contributors’ should 
be given some support. 
 
Feelings on these matters again sometimes run high – in some cases fuelled by 
exaggerated pictures of the amount of money involved, or the generousness of 
the benefits, or the ease with which people who have not paid their dues can tap 
into the system at will. 
 
The issue of redistribution tends to be clouded by these ‘club membership’ 
considerations – many are very unhappy about the thought of money being 
redistributed to people who do not have a real need or a genuine basis for 
claiming. The vehemence of these feelings sometimes overlays sympathy for 
those who really are in need – the term ‘benefits’ has come to be associated 
more in some minds with abuse than with the alleviation of genuine need. It is 
also in relation to benefits that issues of mutuality and club membership most 
often arise – put crudely, the feeling is that scroungers shouldn’t be supported 
because they haven’t done their bit as members of the club. These feelings are 
not universal, but they don’t seem uncommon either.  
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However, most participants in the study would not want to draw rigid lines 
about ‘membership’ issues. Many see broader humanitarian principles which 
may override contracts, rules and contributions (the ‘Samaritan’ approach, see 
D5). The impression is that not many people would simply turn off the welfare 
tap altogether to people who don’t meet membership criteria. This is 
particularly true of healthcare – many participants criticised societies in which 
people don’t get care unless they can prove their credentials. Some people seem 
to take a more inclusive, some a more exclusive approach to these matters. 
Some would argue that people who have paid their dues should benefit from 
having done so, and the system should not allow itself to be persistently taken 
advantage of by people who do not respect its mutuality.  
 
My impression of the general sentiment is that if people are accepted as citizens 
and are prepared to fulfil their side of the mutuality bargain they should be 
entitled to the benefits of citizenship more-or-less ab initio. Until then they are 
not members of the club, and although they should be dealt with humanely and 
charitably, the club rules don’t really apply at that point.  
 
This neat formulation tidies away a lot of real dissent about how ready we 
should be to accept as citizens people who are suspected of simply climbing on 
board to get the benefits, and who may not actually work once established here. 
This is a fraught and contentious issue in which suspicion and hostility conflict 
with (and sometimes overcome) humanitarian impulses. Participants visibly 
took up a range of different positions on this spectrum, and there seem to be 
considerable differences between individuals – although again there are also 
sometimes conflicts within a given individual’s mind.  
 
D7 Altruism and self interest 
The ‘Samaritan’ approach described in D5 rests mainly on altruistic feelings, 
and its drivers are largely moral and ethical. The ‘Membership’ approach has 
more obvious elements of self-interest, insofar as people themselves stand to 
benefit from belonging to the club if and when they need support. However self-
interest is not the only basis for membership, and altruism was sometimes also 
apparent in that context.  
 
These two notions are not in reality quite as discrete as they seem. There may be 
some kind of spectrum on which hard-nosed self-interest sits at one end and 
disinterested humanitarian feelings at the other – and both these elements did 
certainly surface. But many people have a foot in both camps, and the elements 
were often not easy for either participants or moderator to disentangle.  
 
The notion of ‘mutuality’ (see D5) can be seen as having elements of self-
interest and elements of altruism. Even statements like ‘you never know what 
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might happen’ sometimes seem to partake both of a specific desire to ensure 
against personal mishap and a more general sense of the uncertainty of things 
which makes it incumbent on us all to support each other in times of need. 
People are concerned to a degree about mishaps which befall other people as 
well as those that affect themselves – although it would be surprising if the 
latter did not normally loom larger in their minds.  
 
Although altruism and self-interest were both apparent, it tends to be the notion 
of insuring against a ‘rainy day’ which tends to come more widely and rapidly 
to the surface when people try to express why they feel as they do. 
 
I: “You would think it fair that taxpayers who may not themselves ever need 
long-term care for the elderly, should nevertheless be supporting those 
that do need it?” 
F: “Yes I do” 
F: “Yes, because you don’t know who’s going to need it and who isn’t” (Bar 
high right) 
 
There is another class of motives beside self-interest and altruism, relating to the 
kind of society which different approaches to welfare both reflect and help to 
generate. For example some people said that they would not want to live in a 
society which asked people whether they had insurance before deciding whether 
to treat them. This seems related to the altruistic view that sick people should be 
helped, but it is not quite the same thing. For some there is the notion that a 
kindly and supportive society is desirable in itself.  
 
M: “It’s just the society you live in. You’re gonna live in a society where not 
just you, but everyone else is covered – don’t wanna live in a society where 
people are dying, people are getting ill just because they haven’t got the 
ability to pay” 
M: “I would think that’s like basic human rights” 
F: “Yes, but you have to pay for it” 
F: “Well we do. People do say it’s a free service – it’s not, we all pay for it, 
and we’ve paid for it all our lives” (Bar high left) 
 
M: “Well again, it depends what sort of society you want to live in” (Bar high 
left) 
 
M: “We were just talking about here, ‘I might need something out of the 
system, so therefore I’ll put something in’. Is there an element of we need 
to support other people, regardless of – we haven’t sort of touched on that 
element at all, I guess it’s not just who takes what and who’s paid what, 
it’s what responsibility have we got to one another as a society” 
I: “So it’s more than an insurance system?” 
M: “Yeah. The caring environment, caring society” (Bar high right) 
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This notion of societal dividends also sometimes emerged in discussing 
education – if we educate our children well we enjoy a more civilised and more 
effective society, quite apart from the direct benefits to the individuals receiving 
the education. This is sometimes advanced as a reason why people without 
children should still pay for state education (see C2.6).  
 
These societal arguments were again less commonly heard than the more 
obvious ‘insurance’ arguments, but they nevertheless seem worth considering. 
 
A few participants reflected that what they had paid in would be wasted if they 
didn’t actually need to draw on the services, but other people in their groups 
tended to contest this view – sometimes on the ground that your contributions 
would have bought you security and “peace of mind”, and sometimes on the 
more systemic or societal grounds described above. 
 
M: “I ain’t been in a hospital for about nine months and I’m paying all this 
national insurance, tax, for nothing” 
F: “But it’ll be there when you do need it” 
F: “Say if you got run over now, and you turned up and they said, ‘Sorry, 
you’ve never paid a penny’” 
M: “Yeah, but then that’s like in America, you pay your insurance” 
F: “Yeah, but you don’t pay it when you use it, you pay it continuously. And I 
should think theirs is about £300, £400 – my parents live in America, and 
it’s very expensive – and they’ve never used it” (Rug low left) 
 
D8 Winners and losers 
It is implicit in the analysis in D2 above that redistribution produces winners 
and losers. Money tends to flow from better-off to less well-off households, and 
from people who are ‘fortunate’ (for example in health terms) to those who are 
less fortunate. However participants didn’t always have this ‘winners and 
losers’ effect sharply focused in their minds, and often had to grope towards 
articulating it in discussion. 
 
On the whole people endorse this effect, but with some reservations. 
Participants never really queried the principle that people contribute when they 
can and draw out when they need to – this is to some extent the point of the 
system under discussion. It implies that citizens will potentially veer between 
gaining and losing as their fortunes change. 
 
The main qualification to endorsement is that where people are suspected of 
being wilfully ‘non-contributing’ (shirkers or outsiders) they are not usually 
considered as paid-up members of the club. Those who have contributed (or at 
least been willing to do so as far as they were able) are the ‘deserving poor’ (not 
a phrase participants actually used), but those who haven’t bothered or who 
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have just clambered on board were not seen by some participants as morally 
entitled to support. Some people insist that the principles of fairness and 
mutuality have to be satisfied (see D6). 
 
M: “I don’t think people criticise the system – what they will criticise is 
people who’s not paid into it wanting to drain money out” (Shef higher 
pen) 
 
The following dialogue on this point emerged in answer to a question about 
whether the state should pay someone’s long-term care costs. 
 
F: “If they’ve paid into the system, yes” 
I: “Supposing they’ve been ill all their life? They haven’t worked?” 
F: “If somebody’s been ill all their life, they must have been getting some sort 
of – what do you call it – Disability Allowance or something, so that 
should be taken into account too when checking records or whatever. The 
government could look back and say, ‘Well, they haven’t been able to 
work’. They shouldn’t be held to account just because they haven’t 
actually physically paid in any money, because they’ve been unable to” 
F: “It’s different if somebody hasn’t worked because they don’t want to 
work” (Bar high right) 
 
The welfare state can be seen as a kind of implied state-mediated social 
contract12, and the essence of that contract is that the rules oblige citizens to 
make payments proportional to their means, and entitle them to draw services 
proportional to their needs. ‘Means’ and ‘needs’ are defined by those rules. 
People often quarrel with the details of these definitions, but rarely with the 
general principle they embody. 
  
It is therefore not generally felt that what people take out should be directly 
proportional to what they’ve put in. What people pay in may legitimately be 
constrained both by income level (which affects the rate of affordable 
contribution), or by justifiable and unavoidable periods out of the job market 
(which limit their ability to contribute anything at those times). This is generally 
seen as fair enough, and few people would want to curtail entitlement to welfare 
services or benefits on that basis13. As long as people pay in what they 
reasonably can, most participants would think they should be entitled to draw 
out what they need on the same basis as those who have paid a larger whack. To 
                                           
12   That’s my way of describing what people seemed to be saying – no-one actually used this 
term. 
13   The system does sometimes curtail entitlement, albeit in a rather inconsistent, residual 
and fragmentary way. Basic state pension entitlement depends on NI contributions, 
although means-tested entitlement is paradoxically higher than the full pension. There are 
also contributory and non-contributory versions of Jobseekers Allowance.  
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this extent people feel the system is (and should be) redistributive. I referred to 
this as the principle of ‘mutuality’ (see D3, D5). 
 
The important qualifier in most participants’ minds was that people should be 
(at least implicitly) party to the contract, and should have fulfilled their part of 
the bargain by contributing what they reasonably can. To return to the club 
metaphor, to draw on the club’s benefits you need first of all to be a member, 
and secondly to abide by its rules as far as your own obligations are concerned. 
This is the core of what I’ve called mutuality. 
 
D9 Redistribution to pensioners 
Pensioners tend to be generally accepted as a kind of archetypal client group for 
the system, and as such their rights to draw out more than they pay are pretty 
much unquestioned.  
 
F: “I think if people have paid into the system, when they get to later on in 
life, and obviously a decline in health is the thing – they’re entitled! 
They’re entitled, they’ve paid into the system – why shouldn’t they benefit 
from it?” (Bar high right) 
 
There are two mental models of how pensions work – we might call them the 
‘pot’ model and the ‘spot’ model: 
1) The pot model implies that someone pays into a “pension pot” through 
their working life, and then in retirement “gets back” the fruits of what 
they’ve paid in. This is a simple and intuitive picture. It is not in fact the 
way state pension actually works, but it’s roughly how personal pensions 
operate. More pertinently it is how a savings bank works, and I suspect 
the imagery may largely derive from that. It is essentially not a 
redistributive model, because what you draw is pictured as what you 
yourself have paid in earlier, recycling your own previous contributions.  
 
There could still be an overlay of interpersonal redistribution within the 
pot model if you have paid in more or less than you then need to draw, 
but most people don’t usually think about this14. Some picture a 
completely individualised personal pot (the most vivid image), others 
assume there is probably a general fund into which everyone pays and 
from which everyone draws. What these variations on the pot model have 
in common is the sense that you are basically getting back what you 
yourself have put in, not being supported by other people. It all comes out 
of the pot into which you put it earlier. 
                                           
14   Again many people are not sure in any precise terms what they actually paid towards their 
state pension. 
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2) The spot model is a closer reflection of reality, but it seems a much less 
common image. It takes a spot view of the flows of money rather than 
picturing this year’s pension as the product of investments in earlier 
years. In practice the state pension someone draws is actually being paid 
in that year by funds from other people who are earning and paying taxes 
– just as pensioners will normally have paid for others during their 
previous working life. That’s not how it normally looks and feels, 
however. The fact that people normally go through a sequential cycle of 
paying in and then drawing out tends to mask the fact that at any one time 
they are basically either payers or drawers. It is an essentially 
redistributive mechanism in the short term – funds in that year flow from 
workers to pensioners.  
 
The spot model is uncomfortable because it makes pensioners seem less 
self-standing and more dependent on the support of others. The ‘pot’ 
model appears both more intuitive and more appealing.  
 
Moreover the spot model by its very nature rests on an assumption of 
continuity over time. The consent of the generation of workers depends 
on their confidence that the next generation will continue to support them 
when their turn comes to retire. This assumption is no longer made as 
unquestioningly as might once have been the case – younger workers are 
no longer at all convinced that they will eventually get a decent pension 
from the state, which upsets the hitherto more-or-less symmetrical notion 
of cyclic temporal redistribution. 
 
Pensioners themselves often feel that by having “worked all their lives” and 
“paid in” they have “earned” a financial respite. Others tend to see them as 
intrinsically people who need and deserve support from the community – and 
who have paid in earlier in their lives as far as they have been able.  
 
Pensioners’ right to support tends to be seen as unassailable by people below 
pension age, even when they look at it from a purely self-interested point of 
view – unless we die early we shall all reach that point, and unless we are very 
well provided for we shall all want to feel supported. 
 
D10 Redistribution through inputs and outputs 
Redistribution can take place at the input stage when money flows from 
individuals to the state (through progressive taxation), and/or at the output stage 
when money flows from the state to individuals (through services and benefits). 
To explore participants’ feelings about this I showed a ‘quadrant’ diagram with 
all combinations of flat-rate and income-based on both inputs and outputs.  
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The four quadrants were: 
Flat rate in 
Level out 
Flat rate in 
Income-based out 
Income-based in 
Level out 
Income-based in 
Income-based out 
 
This was not an easy set of concepts for people to take in at first, but the chart 
seemed to work reasonably well after careful explanation.   
 
F: “Well, it’s difficult – it’s awfully hard” (Shef lower pen) 
 
The meanings of the quadrants were not fully defined for participants. I often 
gave some explanation in discussion, but to a degree people were left to make of 
them what they could. My impression is that ‘Income-based out’ was generally 
interpreted as intended – limiting benefits for higher income groups (implying 
some form of means test, see below), rather than enhancing benefits for higher 
income groups along the lines of SERPS. 
 
There were few takers for the two upper cells in the quadrant, both of which 
have flat-rate inputs. The idea that everyone should pay in the same amount 
tends to be dismissed as a non-starter. It doesn’t seem either fair or practical.  
 
On the whole participants tended to endorse the bottom left quadrant – paying in 
on an income basis plus drawing out on a level basis. It needs to be clarified that 
‘level’ here means level entitlement rather than that everyone actually takes the 
same15. The system couldn’t work if the output was literally flat-rate 
throughout. 
 
Some were attracted by the bottom-right option, which is income-based in both 
directions – and many felt there should be an element of this in the more widely 
favoured bottom-left option. The ideal position for many people would probably 
be somewhere between bottom-left and bottom-right, but probably closer to the 
former.  
 
M: “Bottom left” 
I: “Income-based in level out?” 
M: “Yeah” 
                                           
15  I tried explaining it as ‘Level out, according to need’, but that wasn’t entirely satisfactory. 
Since ‘need’ is often defined in terms of income (as with means-tested benefits) the 
notion of ‘flat rate according to need’ can sometimes sound very similar to ‘income 
based’. ‘Level entitlement’ (as in the above text) would probably be better.  
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F: “I like the feeling of the right one but in reality it’s got to go to the income-
in and level-out” 
I: “But it’ll be one of the bottom two, the answer?” 
F: “Definitely, yeah” 
M: “Yeah” (Rug low mixed) 
 
I: “So which of those boxes do you think you’d like to come closest to? 
Would be the fairest and best way?” 
F: “The income-based in and income-based out, ideal – but it’s not an ideal 
world” 
M: “Somewhere in the middle of the bottom two” (Bar high right) 
 
The bottom-right option (income-based out) implies some form of means testing 
to relate benefits and services to income levels. Some people would be happy 
with this, but means testing generally seemed an unpopular concept, for the 
reasons set out in C2.5. 
 
Some see conflicts between different values and criteria, so there is sometimes 
an element of ambivalence. I suspect that some participants would have chosen 
different quadrants for different kinds of service or benefit, but there wasn’t 
time to explore this. If we had had time to unpick this topic further we might 
well have found that participants would have wanted to veer towards bottom-
left for some kinds of service or benefit, and towards bottom-right for others. It 
would probably have taken many a while to get their minds round that, 
however. My guess is that health, education and pensions would probably tend 
to centre on bottom left, whereas cash benefits would probably range along a 
spectrum from bottom-left to bottom-right. That is somewhat speculative, 
however, since I didn’t actually ask participants directly about this.  
 
The centre of gravity of people’s overall values seemed surprisingly near the 
Marxist notion of ‘from each according to his means, to each according to his 
needs’. I didn’t suggest this to participants, but I was often struck that it seemed 
to be more-or-less what they were trying to say – often with some qualifi-
cations, but nevertheless that sentiment in essence. One woman who actually 
came up with the above form of words seemed slightly surprised to find herself 
saying it.  
 
F: “It’s very communist, isn’t it? Am I being a communist?” (Shef lower pen) 
 
As some participants pointed out, the preferred approach seems fairly close to 
the present system. The views expressed certainly don’t seem to suggest that 
radical overhaul is wanted from this point of view, although they leave scope 
for tinkering with the precise balance between flat-rate and income-based at the 
output end. There doesn’t appear to be any consensus about whether the system 
should move towards or away from income-based entitlements. Views differ on 
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this – and many people are ambivalent, expressing conflicting criteria. 
Sometimes participants’ views differed by context – for example some people 
argued for means-testing child benefit, but very few for means-testing the basic 
state pension (see C2.5).  
 
Reactions to stimulus material about ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ under the present 
regime also suggests that participants tended to be broadly content with 
something like the present dispensation. 
 
D11 Insurance and ‘mutuality’ 
The ‘insurance’ analogy of welfare is useful, but limited. An insurance model 
fits the ‘random or accidental’ health context better than it fits education or 
pensions. In principle people can generally choose whether or not to have 
children, so this is not in that sense an insurable ‘risk’, although it certainly does 
involve redistribution over time. Retirement is neither accidental nor chosen – it 
is an ineluctable stage which everybody goes through (unless they die 
beforehand). Ill-health or unemployment would generally be regarded as ‘bad 
luck’, but parenthood and retirement are not typically viewed in the same light. 
The latter may be periods of reduced income and/or heightened expenditure 
(and may therefore justify support), but they are not usually seen as insurable 
misfortunes in themselves.  
 
These factors do sometimes have an impact on views about temporal 
redistribution. Few people quarrel with the idea of covering bad luck, or indeed 
retirement, since these are things which are to a large extent beyond the control 
of the individual, and there is a clear assumption of mutuality. On the other 
hand mutuality breaks down in some eyes with children and education – a few 
participants argued that if people have children they should expect to bear the 
cost. This was sometimes applied to child benefit, although not often to 
education. Those who don’t have children do not draw out these benefits at all. 
In some eyes these child-related benefits are therefore poised between temporal 
and interpersonal redistribution16.  
 
Unemployment is an even more vexed issue. If you see it as a quasi-random and 
accidental event it belongs alongside health as an insurance risk. However if 
you believe that some people just choose not to work then the assumption of 
mutuality breaks down (again see D6). They have to be “genuine” to qualify. 
 
                                           
16   It’s important to stress that participants didn’t themselves articulate it in this way. This is 
my analysis of some fairly inchoate feelings.  
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D12 Importance of continuity 
The principle of lifetime redistribution depends on a degree of assumed 
continuity in the system. The rules may change in detail, but you need to be 
confident that it will be “there for you” when it gets to be your turn – otherwise 
you may find you’re paying in for others in your younger days, but not getting 
the reciprocal support in your older age. 
 
I suspect that this continuity has probably been traditionally taken for granted. It 
was very much part of the concept of the welfare state as it emerged in the post-
war years. The promise was particularly implicit in the whole notion of state 
pensions.  
 
However there were signs from this study that continuity is no longer so readily 
taken for granted, and some people now actively question it. Will there be state 
pensions for younger people when they come to retire? Some doubt it, or 
assume that any pension would be worth little by then. Will there even be a 
health service? 
 
M: “They’re trying to scrap the pensions, the government, ain’t they? Trying 
to get rid of them all anyway” 
M: “Yeah, they want you to go private on that as well, yeah” 
F: “I don’t think my kids will get a state pension” 
M: “No, I don’t think I will” 
F: “I think I will” 
F: “I might – just” 
M: “I won’t – like, it’ll all be scrapped” 
I: “If you think it’s going to be scrapped, what do you feel about that?” 
M: “I think it’s wrong, ‘cos the reason why is, like, they want me to start a 
pension at work through this school, and that’s £60 a month, and I can’t 
afford to pay £60 a month into a pension at this time” (Rug low left) 
 
The question marks arise most readily with pensions. They seem to stem 
originally from the 80s, when the Conservative government’s emphasis on 
privatisation led many to suppose that the government was bent on winding up 
the state scheme and letting people make their own arrangements with the 
market. The breaking of the earnings link strengthened this impression – more 
so over time, because it has caused the basic state pension (BSP) to decline 
relative to earnings, to a point where it is now usually seen as not providing 
enough to live on. This seems to confirm the withdrawal scenario, albeit on a 
gradual basis. The present government may seem less privatisation-focused, but 
it has not restored the relative value of the basic state pension to its former level, 
and some assume it is quietly going down the same path of gradual 
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retrenchment17. Whatever people believe about the government’s intentions 
many now feel generally uncertain (and often doubtful) about future continuity, 
and the unquestioning faith in the future of the system that I guess may have 
been commonplace between the 50s and the 70s seems to have been leaking 
away.  
 
F: “When is the cut-off point for the state pension as we know it today? 
Because they’re going to stop it eventually, aren’t they, or something?” 
M: “No, well they can’t stop that, can they?” 
F: “No – well, I thought there was something about – you’ll have to make 
your own arrangement” (Shef lower pen) 
 
Research participants were not generally predicting the demise of the NHS, but 
its future also seems less unquestioningly taken for granted than it might have 
been in earlier years.  
 
Such doubts about the future can clearly affect assumptions of mutuality in the 
system. Willingness to pay in depends on an assumption (tacit if not explicit) 
that appropriate support will still be there when your turn comes to draw out. 
Who would join a Christmas club if they thought there was a fair chance it 
would stop trading by November? Temporal redistribution by its very nature 
only works if there is a fairly high degree of continuity in the system. While 
pensions are the most obvious example of this (because redistribution across 
time is of their essence), the same principle applies also to health and other 
services.  
 
At present there is no evidence that many people have got to the point where 
their uncertainties about future provision have caused them to withdraw support 
for the principles of the welfare state, but this point might come if trust in future 
provision ebbs further.  
 
D13 Geographical redistribution  
Redistribution may have a geographical component. Just as resources flow from 
higher-income to lower-income people, so they may flow from wealthier to 
more disadvantaged areas18.  
                                           
17  The government has made a slight increase in the real value of the BSP, and more 
substantially increased the relative value of the means-tested minimum and the second 
pension for low earners. However these more positive signs are not prominent in public 
awareness, and do not offset the general image of decline.  
18   This would in any case presumably tend to happen co-incidentally to some extent. There 
will be more low-income individuals in low-income areas, so even if redistribution 
happens on an interpersonal basis resources will tend to flow towards poorer areas. But 
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The geographical aspect of redistribution is complex. There was certainly less 
comment about geographical than about interpersonal redistribution. 
Participants didn’t usually seem particularly aware of it. There are some 
reasonably strong images of resource transfer across income groups, but people 
don’t typically have such clear pictures of resources moving between areas.  
 
The evidence on this is very limited, however. There was no time to give proper 
consideration to geographical redistribution, and I had no stimulus material to 
help unpack this topic more thoroughly.  
 
Geographical redistribution only arose spontaneously as an issue in one of the 
three study locations, Barnet. The research took place soon after a substantial 
hike in council tax19 (CT) had hit the doormats. This was mentioned in all the 
study areas because charges had risen generally, but there was a particularly 
strong sense of shock and indignation in in Barnet, where the first two groups 
took place.  
 
F: “Well I just got my bill for the poll tax, or whatever they call it now, and I 
was absolutely appalled, I really was” (Bar high left) 
 
There seem to be two reasons for this: 
? The rise was particularly steep there – people were reporting an increase 
of over 20% in CT against a background of apparently rising discontent 
with public services in the area, and since there are a lot of high-band 
properties the impact would be strongly felt. This had a considerable 
impact on the opening conversation, and some participants were clearly a 
bit stunned by the rise 
? But what gave particular bite to their sense of grievance was the story 
circulating that the rise was due to money being transferred from richer 
southern authorities to poorer northern councils. It was almost as if they 
visualised lorry loads of money being lifted from Barnet and trucked up 
the M1 to (as it might be) Barnsley.  
 
This implication of direct transfer payments clearly made people feel 
uncomfortable. There were clues that some would have been happier with 
the image that they were all paying into a central pot from which more 
needy LAs are able to make larger withdrawals. This is in effect 
                                                                                                                                   
this is not the same as having a deliberate policy of supporting disadvantaged areas in 
their own right. It’s the latter I’m considering here.  
19   Still generally referred to as “poll tax” – people often have to search their minds for the 
proper current title. 
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presumably what actually happened, but it may not have been the 
stereotype projected by local media or campaigns. 
 
I: “Would you object in principle to some areas being in a sense taxed more 
heavily to support others?” 
F: “Yes, I would” 
M: “Yes” 
F: “On local taxation, yes” 
M: “I think they should come from national taxes rather than local taxes” 
F: “Grants from national rather than taken from one to the other” (Bar high 
left) 
 
In practice (and insofar as the rise is due to the government making a 
geographical resource shift) it would presumably happen indirectly 
through changes in the formula which determines grants for local 
authorities, and is therefore actually an example of the central pot model 
– but it tended to be spoken of as if the burghers of Barnet were having to 
bail out their northern counterparts directly. 
 
The impression is that people tend to feel less comfortable with the notion of 
redistribution between areas, and less intuitively clear about the basis for it. It 
would be interesting to know how they would respond to stimulus material 
which clarified the case for geographical redistribution, but this was not offered 
here. As matters stand it doesn’t seem immediately obvious to most people why 
it should take place.  
 
A few people argued against geographical redistribution for local taxes on the 
grounds that the actual services are the same (bin collection, policing etc) and 
therefore everyone ought to pay the same for them. This was sometimes also 
used as an argument against banded council tax payments. And indeed it is in 
general an anti-redistributive perspective – you should pay for what you get, not 
according to your means. It was not very widely heard, but it did come up. It 
also perhaps illustrates that for some people thinking about redistribution varies 
according to the type of service under discussion. 
 
M: “It sounds like the council tax has been evened out so that people in higher 
income boroughs like Harrow and Barnet are paying slightly more than 
lower incomes in the north” 
F: “That doesn’t feel fair though, does it, because they’re getting the same 
services as us” (Bar high left) 
 
F: “Council tax is supposed to be for all these sorts of things, police, fire and 
all that, yet depending on the area you live in depends on how much 
council tax you’ve got to pay. And yet whether you’re a poor person or a 
wealthy person you all still need the same things. Still need dustmen, 
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hospitals, police, no matter what, so why do some people have to pay a lot 
more than others?” 
F: “You only have one bin regardless of the size of your house” (Rug low 
mixed) 
 
Some participants took a more supportive view of geographical redistribution 
however, recognising the problems of areas with poor economies. 
 
M: “Certain taxes you can’t have the same across the board ‘cos 
geographically, when you talk about up north, they have not got the same 
potential to generate the same income, so they’re being compromised 
anyway. So when it comes to areas like council tax I fully understand why 
someone living on the northern tip of Scotland can’t possibly be expected 
to pay the same local taxes as me” 
F: “It’s not even so much that, but a lot of the jobs were taken away from 
Wales and Scotland and places like that, so people say, ‘Oh well, then 
move to get a job’. Well excuse me, the whole of Scotland’s got to move 
south, the whole of Wales has gotta move east – it’s not possible. So how 
do these people generate an income when the actual industry has been 
taken away – it’s gone” 
I: “So would you be prepared to consider money being charged?” 
F: “I think I would have to because I’ve seen my own city, all the industry’s 
been taken away” (Bar high left) 
 
The cost of living (and particularly housing) is seen to vary a lot between areas. 
The amount you need to live on is therefore also seen to vary. 
 
However, at present geographical issues within Britain don’t tend to present 
themselves in the context of tax, spending and redistribution, unless they are 
pushed into prominence by events (as in Barnet). Many people seem uncertain 
or even wary about redistribution based on geography.  
 
Geographical issues sometimes arise in relation to the concept of mutuality. The 
welfare state generally seems to be thought of as a national affair. Everyone in 
the country pays in and takes according to the principles of mutuality set out in 
D5.  
 
D14 Responses to redistributive effects 
After the topic of redistribution had been explored in general terms, participants 
were given two sets of numerical evidence about the extent of redistribution if 
the value of health, education and social security services received is set beside 
the tax paid for each of the income quintile groups introduced in C3. 
 
Chart N below shows the redistributive situation at a single point in time, and 
chart P shows the same information calculated on a lifetime basis. Both charts 
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were based on calculations made by CASE20. This was generally completely 
new information to participants, who did not seem to have seen figures like 
these before, and did not generally even have estimates of their own in their 
heads. The charts needed careful explanation – their meaning is not intuitively 
obvious.  
 
Some people thought the pattern shown in Chart N is broadly what they would 
have expected, but many found it hard to understand why the lower income 
groups consume more of the state’s resources. The fact that the upper income 
groups pay more tax is expected (see Chart I, C3), but people had not generally 
expected to find that they also get less back, as these figures show. In a few 
cases people found it not only difficult to understand, but also hard to believe.  
 
M: “You know this top group? Why are they only getting 3,400 and the lower 
group is getting 9,800 – because the kiddies go to the same school, if they 
go to see the doctor they get the plaster same as we get a plaster, or 
whatever it is” (Shef lower pen) 
 
N    Who gains, taking spending and tax together? 
Lose £10800 a year- £14200£3400 Highest income
Lose £3500 a year- £8600£51002nd highest
Gain £700 a year- £5900£6600Middle band
Gain £5700 a year- £3700£94002nd lowest
Gain £7400 a year- £2400£9800Lowest income
So net result:Tax paid 
for these
Health, 
education 
and social 
security
Income band
Note: Tax allocated is amount needed for these parts of spending
2000- 2001  
 
                                           
20  The figures for cross-sectional redistribution in 2000-01 are based on C. Lakin (2002), 
‘The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 2000-01’, Economic Trends (see 
ONS website). The figures for lifetime redistribution in Exhibit P were based on 
J.Falkingham and J. Hills (eds) (1995), The Dynamic of Welfare: The welfare state and 
the life cycle (Prentice Hall), Tables 6.9 and 7.6, adjusted for earnings growth between 
1991 and 2000-01. 
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The main explanation is that client groups who are intensive consumers of 
public resources (like pensioners and non-working single parents) would tend to 
be located in the lower income groups, but this is quite a complex concept 
which only a few people were able to work out for themselves.  
 
Some people (notably pensioners) were also surprised (and often incredulous) to 
see what their own income group was deemed to be taking out of the system. 
They had been complaining about how small their pensions are, and suddenly 
they were confronted with figures suggesting they are getting a lot more than 
they actually receive in cash. This is very important, because it underlines how 
unconscious many people are of the value of what they get back from the state 
in return for the taxes they pay.  
 
M: “I’m amazed at how much in reality – I don’t know for everybody, but I 
certainly would say I’d taken out of the system in dental treatment, optical 
treatment, hospital care, education” 
F: “If you’re unfortunate enough to be ill” 
M: “I’ve accepted that – three daughters that have all gone through 
education, personally” 
I: “Do you think you don’t ever work out in your mind what you’re getting?” 
M: “No, I don’t think I do” 
M: “No, I don’t think about it” 
F: “It’s almost as if we think it’s our right, isn’t it?” 
M: “Yeah, yeah, you accept it as a right” (Shef higher pen) 
 
Reactions to the chart demonstrate two main things: 
? That the public get back more than they think in return for their tax 
money, and that the lower income groups actually draw more in services 
than they contribute. 
? That the scale of redistribution between income groups looks larger on 
this basis than when considering the tax data in isolation.  
 
The general response was to accept the validity of a redistributive effect of this 
kind of magnitude. Some still felt that high earners should be contributing more, 
but if anything this feeling seemed a bit less common than when just looking at 
the tax figures.  
 
F: “It’s got to be like that, because we, on our income, can’t afford to lose 
£10,800, can we? So it’s got to be right – I mean they can’t be taking that 
off us” (Shef lower pen) 
 
F: “The people on a lower income can’t afford to pay more taxes, and you 
can’t suddenly say to them, ‘We can’t put into your health’” 
I: “I don’t get the impression you’re saying the system ought to be changed 
dramatically in terms of some groups paying more or getting more” 
F: “No, I don’t think it should” 
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M: “Oh, I think they should pay more, the highest band” 
F: “It depends what you do, I don’t think you should be penalised for earning 
well” 
M: “Maybe a couple of percent more than what the lowest one pays… They 
could pay a bit more tax couldn’t they? The highest ones could, I’d say” 
F: “No, I think good luck to them, they’re working hard to earn that sort of 
money” (Rug low left) 
 
F: “Looking at that, if I still had the chance to go into the higher grade 
earnings I’d go for it even knowing that I’d be paying that like that, 
because I’m going to lead a much better life aren’t I?” 
F: “I don’t think it’s unreasonable to expect (high incomes to pay) 10 grand 
or 11 grand – they will probably think so but – ” 
I: “You think that for them to be subsidising the system as it were, if that’s a 
fair way of putting it, to the tune of £10,000 a year is not unreasonable for 
the incomes they’re on?” 
F: “No” 
F: “Well it’s only a few grand more than the poorer ones – and for someone 
that’s quite wealthy they wouldn’t notice it anyway, over a whole year” 
I: “The idea is they’re putting £10,800 more in the pot than they’re taking 
out” 
F: “It’s like a swing type of thing, isn’t it – some can’t afford it and there’s 
the other end that can” 
M: “That’s right, because they can afford it they have to pay … Well they’ve 
chosen their profession – it’s like we didn’t ask to be in the lower band but 
they wanted to be in the highest band, they got there” 
F: “When you look at their income it’s worth the first two lots put together” 
(Rug low mixed) 
 
P    Who gains on lifetime basis? (at 2000-2001 prices)
£1583,000
£1114,000
£918,000
£762,000
£556,000
Lifetime 
income
Lose £154,000
Lose £28,000
Gain £13,000
Gain £54,000
Gain £118,000
Net result
-10%£369,000£215,000Highest income
-3%£257,000£229,0002nd highest
1%£213,000£226,000Middle
7%£176,000£230,0002nd lowest
21%£129,000£247,000Lowest income
Net as 
% of 
income
Total taxTotal gain 
from health, 
education, 
benefits
Lifetime 
Incomes
Note: This time figures are per individual (not per household)
2000- 2001  
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Chart P projects the kind of information shown in Chart N across a whole 
lifetime. This lifetime perspective is quite a difficult concept, and needed some 
explaining. Participants were told that the figures are in today’s prices, and 
assume that the current rules would have applied throughout the lifetime – a 
necessary simplifying assumption, but clearly not true in real life. 
 
This lifetime data inevitably has to be on an individual basis, whereas previous 
charts have shown household-based incomes. Some people struggled a little 
with that transition.  
 
F: “It’s all a bit confusing really, to be honest” (Bar high right) 
 
However, in spite of all these complexities the broad thrust of the message 
usually seemed to come across fairly clearly. Some understanding had built up 
through previously considering Charts I and N – it was mainly the lifetime 
element that is new. I am doubtful whether people would have been able to cope 
with this chart if they had come across it cold, however, without preparation or 
explanation. 
 
Taken by themselves these lifetime figures can seem frighteningly large, 
particularly to the lower-income groups. Suddenly we are talking about gains 
and losses of well over a hundred thousand at the extremes. Some people started 
to feel sorry for the highest income group simply because of the large amount 
they were losing (£154,000). In view of the sheer size of the lifetime figures I 
added the last two columns about lifetime income after the first two sessions 
had been completed. I felt that incomes would help give people a sense of scale, 
and provide a yardstick for interpreting the gains and losses. Experience in the 
later groups suggests this was a useful addition. 
 
F: “Looking at £136,000 seems an awful lot of money – but to them it’s not a 
lot of money. That’s frightening, looking at that, but it’s not in relative 
terms” (Bar high right) 
 
On the whole participants still endorsed the feeling that the system as reflected 
here is fair. Some would still like to see the upper groups pay more, others feel 
the balance is about right as it is.  
 
F: “When you look at this higher income in the lifetime, they’ve had nearly a 
million pound, whereas the lower one had only had half a million” 
F: “They’ve had a better life than we’ve had” 
F: “So, I can’t see any fault in that, I really can’t. And the standard of living, 
it would’ve been a lot better than what them poorer people – they probably 
can sit with the central heating on all day, whereas them people – . So I 
can’t see anything wrong in that at all – not when you look at the full total 
of a life income, at what they’ve got aside of what the others have got” 
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M: “They’ve paid all that, but they haven’t missed it – whereas the 
pensioner’s struggled” (Shef lower pen) 
 
I: “Do you think they should be paying more than 10% of their income?” 
M: “Yeah, I think they should” 
F: “They’ve got half the better lifestyle than what we have up at that end” 
F: “I don’t think they’d miss it” 
M: “Another 2% wouldn’t hurt them, would it?” (Shef lower pen) 
 
F: “The highest income lose an awful lot don’t they?” 
M: “Yeah, I’m starting to feel sorry for them!” 
F: “I now know why they go to live abroad!” 
F: “There’s a big difference between the two – the second highest and the 
highest, isn’t there? I suppose really, it just comes down to is it fair? 
Should the highest people always lose out, because they’re earning more 
money and maybe in better circumstances?” 
M: “But for a high income person it’s not that much. Over a lifetime £136,000 
is . . . I think it’s quite impressive that it about levels out” 
M: “It feels about right, I guess” (Bar high right) 
 
M: “I would think them on the highest income wouldn’t notice it anyway” 
F: “No, they wouldn’t” (Shef higher pen) 
 
F: “When you look at it, it looks really unfair on the people on the highest 
income. They’re not getting as much out, and putting a lot more in” 
I: “Do you think that’s wrong? Do you think they shouldn’t have to pay? Do 
you think everybody should get the same? Pay the same?” 
F: “No, because people on lower incomes just couldn’t afford it, and then it 
wouldn’t be fair to say, ‘Oh you can’t have this, you can’t have that’” 
I: “But 10% of a lifetime’s income sounds a bit steep to you?” 
F: “It is, it is a lot, yeah” 
F: “Well, I would say it sounded OK” 
M: “If you look at the lifetime income, they’ve lost 10%, the highest ones, but 
if you look at the lowest to the highest incomes, they’re still three times 
more than what they’re getting – so they can lose 10%, they’re not going 
to bother about that” (Rug low left) 
